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THE USE AND MISUSE OF DISCLOSURE AS A 
REGULATORY SYSTEM 
PAULA J. DALLEY*
ABSTRACT
 Over the past several decades, legislators and regulators have in-
creasingly turned to disclosure schemes, rather than substantive regu-
lation, to accomplish regulatory goals. Most of these schemes are ei-
ther expressly or impliedly based on the disclosure-based regulatory 
system established by the securities acts, which is primarily intended 
to provide information to traders in an established market and 
thereby enhance the operation of the market. A secondary purpose of 
the securities acts is to alter the behavior of firms and individuals 
through the operation of the market. Other disclosure schemes usually 
have similar purposes, but they rarely operate in a market akin to the 
financial markets. As a result, the mechanism by which the disclosure 
scheme is expected to accomplish its purpose is often obscure. Where 
there is a specified mechanism for the operation of the disclosure sys-
tem, it often fails to take account of the way individuals and firms 
process and react to information. This Article examines the purposes 
and operation of both securities disclosure and other disclosure 
schemes and the limitations on the usefulness of disclosure as a regu-
latory method. The Article then describes criteria for the use and de-
sign of disclosure systems as regulatory tools that take into considera-
tion realistic benefits and costs of the disclosure regime.
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I.   INTRODUCTION
 For the past several decades, legislators and regulators have 
adopted disclosure schemes to accomplish regulatory goals.1 From 
the Truth in Lending Act2 to the ABA’s Model Court Rule on Insur-
ance Disclosure,3 lawmakers have turned to information as a regula-
tory tool because it is politically acceptable and it interferes less with 
individual choice and with the operation of markets. Mandatory dis-
closure has become a sort of “regulation-lite” extolled even by those 
who would ordinarily oppose regulation.4
 Even as disclosure requirements have become increasingly com-
mon and their regulatory goals increasingly ambitious, however, re-
search in psychology and economics has cast doubt on the traditional 
account of how people process information. Current understanding of 
heuristic biases and bounded rationality suggests that information 
may affect behavior in unexpected ways and may not, in some cir-
cumstances, affect behavior at all. More troubling, we may not be 
able to predict how information will affect behavior. Behavioral re-
search also suggests that more information is not necessarily a good 
thing. Such behavioral research has led to increased calls for changes 
in the way disclosure-based regulations are used and have caused 
some to question the very utility of disclosure-based regulation.5
 The model for the use of disclosure as a regulatory device is the 
system established by the securities acts. That system is not perfect, 
but to the extent it is successful, its success is largely because it op-
erates in a singular environment: a highly developed, relatively effi-
cient market with an enormous support structure of both market and 
informational intermediaries, in a context in which decision-makers 
often seek professional advice and make great efforts to be as ra-
 1. The earliest instance of which the author is aware of a disclosure-like obligation 
being used as regulation occurred in 1360, when a rule prohibiting the sale of fish in secret 
replaced a rule setting a fixed price. See GWEN SEABOURNE, ROYAL REGULATION OF LOANS 
AND SALES IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 88 (2003).  
 2. Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1601-93 (2000)). 
 3. MODEL COURT RULE ON INSURANCE DISCLOSURE (2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/clientpro/Model_Rule_InsuranceDisclosure.pdf. 
 4. See Kimberly A. Strassel, The Weekend Interview with Christopher Cox: Full Dis-
closure, WALL ST. J., May 20, 2006, at A8. Ms. Strassel, a member of the Wall Street Jour-
nal’s editorial board, expresses great delight at the apparently novel (to her) idea that se-
curities markets should be regulated by disclosure. See id. 
 5. See, e.g., Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure An-
tidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV.
139, 148-49 (2006) (discussing the shortcomings of disclosure-based regulation). 
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tional as possible. This environment provides a mechanism by which 
disclosed information can reach its audience, affect behavior, and 
cause a desired result through its operation on a single variable, the 
price of a security. It is at least doubtful whether disclosure could ac-
complish similar goals in different circumstances, and there is no 
reason at all to assume that disclosure could accomplish different 
goals in different circumstances. 
 A regulation is supposed to have a goal, and there ought to be a 
reason to think that the regulation, through the operation of some 
mechanism, will accomplish that goal.6 Disclosure-based schemes 
tend to be based on statements of purpose such as “improving trans-
parency” or “providing information to consumers,” but they often fail 
to explain why that additional information will be of value or why its 
existence will cause some desired change in behavior. The mecha-
nism by which information affects behavior is complex. The informa-
tion must be directed at the appropriate decision-maker and the ap-
propriate decision. Furthermore, it must be provided in a form acces-
sible to and usable by the appropriate decision-maker, and the deci-
sion-maker must be able respond to the information. Moreover, dis-
closure can have significant costs beyond the costs of creating and 
disseminating the information.  
 This Article seeks to examine regulatory disclosure systems gen-
erally, using the securities laws as a paradigm, in an effort to deter-
mine when and how disclosure systems work and to provide guide-
lines for the use of disclosure by regulators. Part II discusses the 
practical and philosophical reasons for the popularity of disclosure-
based regulations. Part III contains a discussion of securities disclo-
sure, including its purposes, the mechanism by which it operates, 
and its limitations. Part IV provides a similar examination of dis-
closure systems generally, using a variety of disclosure schemes as 
examples. Part V sets out a number of recommendations about 
prerequisites that regulators must meet before using disclosure 
systems as regulation. 
 6. See Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000) (requiring that rules 
include “a concise general statement of their basis and purpose”). In the words of one trea-
tise,
an agency must set forth the basis and purpose of the rule in a detailed state-
ment, often several hundred pages long, in which the agency refers to the evi-
dentiary basis for all factual predicates, explains its method of reasoning from 
factual predicates to the expected effects of the rule, [and] relates the factual 
predicates and expected effects of the rule to each of the statutory goals or pur-
poses the agency is required to further or to consider. 
I RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §7.4, at 442 (4th ed. 2002). 
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II.   THE POPULARITY OF DISCLOSURE-BASED REGULATION
 There are dozens, possibly hundreds, of regulatory schemes that 
use disclosure in whole or in part to accomplish their purposes.7
Regulatory disclosure schemes blossomed in the 1980s under the 
Reagan administration as part of a trend to inform and educate 
rather than regulate.8 Disclosure-based regulation has both prag-
matic and political justifications. First, it comports with the view 
that command-and-control regulation does not work.9 Moreover, it is 
easier to require disclosure than to regulate substantively,10 which 
requires identifying desirable and undesirable behaviors, showing 
them to be beneficial or harmful, showing that the proposed regula-
tion will have the desired effect on the behavior, and showing that 
the costs of compliance with the regulation and the unintended con-
sequences of the regulation will not outweigh its benefits.11 Disclo-
sure can be used to regulate even when we are unsure what to regu-
late, because the decision about behavior is left to a third party, the 
target of the disclosure. Also, disclosure moves decision-making away 
from the government and down to the individual or firm, which often 
 7. Mary Graham identifies the following examples of disclosure-based regulation: 
drinking water, nutritional content, toxic releases, the presence of lead paint in residential 
housing, SUV rollover rates, organically grown and genetically modified foods, workplace 
hazards, sweatshop conditions, airline safety incidents, and lending “red-lining” practices. 
MARY GRAHAM, INFORMATION AS RISK REGULATION: LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE 1-4 (Innova-
tions in American Government Program, Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innova-
tion, Paper 10-01, 2001), available at http://www.ashinstitute.harvard.edu/Ash/m_graham.pdf; 
see also William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American 
Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1707-10 (1999) (describing deluge of disclosure-
based regulations in health care). 
 8. See Robert S. Adler & R. David Pittle, Cajolery or Command: Are Education Cam-
paigns an Adequate Substitute for Regulation?, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 159, 159-60 (1984); see 
also Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and 
Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 613 (1999) (noting that regulation by disclosure “has be-
come one of the most striking developments in the last generation of American law”). 
 9. See Adler & Pittle, supra note 8, at 160-61; see also GRAHAM, supra note 7, at 1 
(noting that “[a]t a time when distrust and downsizing of government are dominant 
themes, [mandatory information disclosure] is gaining prominence”); Sage, supra note 7, at 
1714; Sunstein, supra note 8, at 625. 
 10. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 163 (1982); Douglas A. Ky-
sar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Con-
sumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 526, 527 (2004). Disclosure schemes can also be used 
when direct regulation is impossible. For example, the proposed V-chip system combines a 
rating system with parental control technology in a situation where the First Amendment 
prohibits direct regulation. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 621. 
 11. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 10, at 101-09 (describing the standard-setting proc-
ess); PIERCE, supra note 6, §7.1, at 413 (discussing court interpretations of the “arbitrary 
and capricious” standard requiring agencies to explain the reasoning behind a rule 
and to respond to all major comments and alternatives); Bradley C. Karkkainen, In-
formation as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precur-
sor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 272-76 (2001) (describing the difficulties of 
environmental regulation). 
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permits more efficient decision-making.12
 Second, disclosure schemes comport with the prevailing political 
philosophy in that disclosure preserves individual choice while avoid-
ing direct governmental interference.13 Disclosure is a “soft” form of 
intervention that does not directly mandate change in the underlying 
behavior.14 In other words, it is a form of civil regulation—regulation 
by society, not the government.15 Moreover, disclosure-based regula-
tion appeals to those with a promarket political orientation because 
it addresses market failure without disturbing other beneficial fea-
tures of the market.16
 In addition, disclosure-based regulation may reflect a changing 
political dynamic.17 The insights of public choice theory apply to stat-
utes requiring disclosure as well as to any other kind of statute, and 
it may be that the increase in regulation by disclosure reflects an im-
proved ability by regulated groups to use the legislative process to 
avoid direct regulation.18 Similarly, the adoption of less intrusive dis-
closure schemes by regulators may reflect increased influence by 
regulated parties on agency rulemaking.19
III.   DISCLOSURE UNDER THE SECURITIES ACTS
 The archetype of the use of disclosure as a regulatory scheme is 
the system established by the securities acts. The Securities Act of 
1933 requires disclosure of a wide range of specified information 
about the issuer of a security before the security can be sold to the 
public,20 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires that pub-
licly traded companies periodically provide specified information to 
 12. See Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 293. 
 13. See id.; GRAHAM supra note 7, at 11; Sage, supra note 7, at 1707. 
 14. John Parkinson, Disclosure and Corporate Social and Environmental Performance: 
Competitiveness and Enterprise in a Broader Social Frame, 3 J. CORP. L. STUD. 3, 4 (2003). 
 15. See id.
 16. See Sage, supra note 7, at 1706-07, 1796-97 (relating an anecdote illustrating the 
importance of couching disclosure as a mechanism for supporting a market). 
 17. See WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. KIP VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO 
REGULATION 1 (1992) (noting rise of right-to-know movement and increased skepticism 
about command-and-control regulation in the 1970s); Sage, supra note 7, at 1772 (noting 
relative ease of enacting disclosure requirements); id. at 1828 (noting temptation to use 
disclosure as a “placeholder solution” to difficult political problems). 
 18. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 614 n.7. 
 19. See MARY GRAHAM, DEMOCRACY BY DISCLOSURE 140 (2002) (describing industry 
support for disclosure requirements); cf. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: 
Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 571, 610-13 (2005) (making a 
similar point about the growth in the number of regimes limiting organizational criminal 
liability where the organization has adopted compliance policies). 
 20. See Securities Act of 1933 §5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000) (requiring registration 
statement); Form S-1 Registration Statement, 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶7121, at 6237-2 
(describing contents).  
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shareholders and the marketplace.21 Although almost everyone 
agrees that the fundamental philosophy of the securities acts is dis-
closure,22 the operation of that regulatory mechanism, and even its 
purpose, is less clear.  
A.   Purposes 
1.   Reducing Informational Asymmetries 
 The purpose of securities disclosure is often stated to be providing 
more information to investors.23 Alternatively, the policy can be de-
scribed as remedying information asymmetries that existed between 
investors, on the one hand, and issuers and promoters of securities, 
on the other, before 1933.24 Because information asymmetries cause 
market participants to demand compensatory premia, a disclosure 
policy that reduces those asymmetries will improve the price-setting 
function of the market.25 According to a congressional report, the se-
curities acts are based on the proposition that the independent 
judgments of buyers and sellers in a securities market will best de-
termine accurate prices for securities if those buyers and sellers have 
adequate information.26 Thus, disclosure is essential to the function-
ing of the capital markets because “the most efficient allocation of re-
sources will occur when the information is sufficient for the purposes 
of those making decisions, when it is reliable, and when it is dis-
seminated in a timely manner.”27 Pricing risk is one of the essential 
functions of the securities markets, and disclosure of information im-
proves market participants’ ability to assess and price risk.  
 Also, by making information available to all, rather than allowing 
it to be distributed unevenly to selected market participants in a 
manner that would be perceived to be unfair,28 disclosure require-
 21. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§13, 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78m, 78n (2000). 
 22. This fact is more newsworthy than one might think. See Strassel, supra note 4. 
 23. See generally SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL 
OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE ’33 AND ’34 ACTS (THE WHEAT REPORT)
10, 46, 49 (1969) [hereinafter THE WHEAT REPORT] (noting that national securities policy 
emphasizes disclosure because one main purpose of securities regulation is providing in-
vestors and speculators access to information). 
 24. See Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the 
Evolving Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 649, 649-50 (1995). 
Broker-dealer regulation is also directed at informational asymmetries between investors 
and market professionals. See id.
 25. See Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic Performance: 
The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 346-48, 368 (2003). See generally Robert E. Verrec-
chia, Essays on Disclosure, 32 J. ACCT. & ECON. 97, 101-40 (2001) (describing in detail various 
economic models of investor behavior that help describe the effect of disclosure on prices). 
 26. H.R. REP. NO. 98-910, vol. 1, at 563, 574-75 (1977) [hereinafter SEC 1977
ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT].
 27. Id.
 28. See id. at 632. 
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ments can increase public confidence in the market. Mandatory dis-
closure29 requirements also ensure that disclosed information is 
standardized and, therefore, more easily comparable.30 Finally, dis-
closure requirements assure investors that additional information 
will be available on a regular and timely basis. 
 These goals all involve enhancing the function of the securities 
markets. The SEC, however, also considers its mission to be the pro-
tection of investors.31 Those goals are not the same and may not even 
be purely complementary. Market efficiency may be enhanced, for 
example, when investors’ mistakes are punished by losses and inves-
tors have the opportunity to learn to invest more rationally or to stay 
out of the market and leave the decision-making to experts.32 Modern 
portfolio theory suggests that any rational investor will hold a well-
diversified mix of common stocks and other investments.33 Should se-
curities regulations be designed with those investors in mind or 
should the SEC be concerned with protecting the nondiversified in-
vestor, who may be at greater risk?34 Also, regulation of different 
kinds of investments may be directed at different kinds of investors.  
Hedge fund investors, for example, tend to be wealthy and sophisti-
cated, while mutual fund investors tend to be middle class and unso-
phisticated.35 And, as discussed below, the relevant audience for most 
securities disclosure is not investors at all, but informational and 
 29. There has long been a debate about whether securities disclosure should be man-
datory. See generally LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 180-88 (3d
ed. 1989) (discussing the debate). 
 30. See Sharon Hannes, Comparisons Among Firms: (When) Do They Justify Manda-
tory Disclosure?, 29 J. CORP. L. 699, 703-04 (2004). 
 31. According to its website, “[t]he mission of the [SEC] is to protect investors, main-
tain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.” U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market In-
tegrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2007).  
 32. See Jill E. Fisch, Regulatory Responses to Investor Irrationality: The Case of the 
Research Analyst, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 57, 74 (2006). 
 33. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 29, at 185 n.42. 
 34. This debate was illustrated by an exchange between participants at the Annual 
Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools. See Podcast: Do the Benefits of Secu-
rities Regulation in the United States Warrant the Costs?, held by the Section on Securi-
ties Regulation, Association of American Law Schools (Jan. 4, 2006), available at
http://www.aals.org/am2006/program/wednesday.html). Erik Sirri, Director of the SEC’s 
Division of Market Regulation and former SEC Chief Economist, who was at the time a 
Professor of Finance at Babson College, remarked, “[I]f . . . from a regulatory perspective—
for . . . disclosure and other things—you were to work with the assumption that investors 
are diversified, I think you’d have a very different framework for how you approach securi-
ties regulation. A lot of things are built around a different assumption . . . .” Id. Richard 
Booth, Professor of Law, University of Maryland, interjected, “[A]nd, I would say, incor-
rectly.” Id. Professor Sirri responded, “ ‘[I]nvestor protection’ isn’t cast as ‘investor protec-
tion for diversified investors.’ It’s ‘investor protection.’ ” Id.
 35. See Henry T.C. Hu, The New Portfolio Society, SEC Mutual Fund Disclosure, and 
the Public Corporation Model, 60 BUS. LAW. 1303, 1307, 1357-58 (2005). 
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market intermediaries. In sum, the goal of providing information to 
investors is less straightforward than one might think. 
2.   Regulating Lawful Conduct 
 Further complicating the picture of the purpose of securities regu-
lation are those who argue that the disclosure requirements of the 
securities acts are also intended to deter undesirable conduct.36
Commentators describing the origins of the disclosure requirements 
of the securities acts frequently quote Louis Brandeis, that 
“[s]unlight is . . . the best of disinfectants.”37 For example, the securi-
ties acts sought to address the problem of excessive insider and un-
derwriter compensation, including conflict-of-interest transac-
tions, by “emphasiz[ing] publicity of insiders’ compensation.”38 Ac-
cording to Brandeis, if brokers’ fees and commissions are unrea-
sonable, investors will refuse to invest with them and the brokers 
will change their policies.39
 Recent initiatives by the SEC and Congress, while continuing to 
use disclosure as the primary means of regulating financial markets 
and the participants therein, increasingly appear to be intended to 
affect firms’ behavior. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX),40
which was enacted in response to financial scandals at a number of 
companies in the early 2000s, provides an example of this. SOX re-
quires, among other things, that a publicly traded firm disclose 
whether it has a financial expert on its audit committee and whether 
it has an ethics code for senior executives.41 Neither SOX nor the 
 36. According to an SEC Report, a “less direct” consideration underlying securities 
disclosure is that “publicity tends to deter questionable practices.” THE WHEAT REPORT,
supra note 23, at 10; see also id. at 50-51 (noting that disclosure helps eliminate “conflicts 
of interest and questionable business practices”); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and 
Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1294-
96 (1999). Williams argues at length about the legitimacy of requiring corporations to dis-
close “social” information (such as environmental effects). See id. at 1273-1311. However, 
she limits the discussion of the utility of that information to two pages—mentioning that 
disclosure will enable shareholders to understand the tradeoffs made between economic 
benefits and social or environmental harms, will encourage managers to improve because 
“managers ‘manage what they measure,’ ” and will encourage good behavior because peo-
ple want to look good in the press. See id. at 1294-96. 
 37. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 
(reprint 1971) (2d ed. 1932). 
 38. Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System,
9 J. CORP. L. 1, 45-46 (1983). 
 39. See BRANDEIS, supra note 37, at 101-04. 
 40. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7264-65 (Supp. 2004). According to the SEC, the purpose of the rules 
was to create “greater transparency,” “to improve the quality of information available to 
investors,” and to “assist the market to properly value securities, which in turn should lead 
to more efficient allocation of capital resources.” Disclosure Required by Sections 404, 406 
and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Securities Act Release No. 8177, Exchange Act 
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rules promulgated thereunder require firms to have such an expert 
or an ethics code; however, a firm that does not must disclose why it 
does not.42 If the purpose of required disclosure is to provide inves-
tors with the information they need to make informed investment 
decisions, this new requirement makes sense only if the presence 
of an audit committee expert or an ethics code is relevant to the 
investment decision.43 Given the amount of information already 
being disclosed, it is more likely that the unspoken purpose of the 
requirement is to force companies to appoint audit committee ex-
perts and adopt ethics codes. 
 Recent efforts to improve disclosure of executive compensation44
are also aimed at changing conduct.45 The use of disclosure to rein in 
executive compensation dates back to the original enactment of the 
securities laws, which envisioned that disclosure of insider compen-
sation not only would “alert potential investors that specific firms 
Release No. 47235, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶86,818, at 
86,901 (Jan. 23, 2003). 
 42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7264-65. 
 43. Theoretically, a wide variety of nonfinancial information might affect the riski-
ness of an investment and therefore its price. Information about corporate governance, ex-
ecutive compensation, and conflicts of interest might all fall into this category. However, 
evidence and theory also suggest that decision-makers base their decisions on a limited 
number of factors and that the quality of decisions declines as information on more factors 
becomes available. See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the link 
between corporate governance and financial performance has not been conclusively estab-
lished. See Bernard S. Black et al., Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms’ Market 
Value?: Evidence from Korea, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 366, 367 (2006); Phyllis Plitch, Moving 
the Market: S&P Quits Rating Corporate Governance in U.S., WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2005, 
at C3; Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE’s Director Independence Listing 
Standards 17-19 (Univ. Cal. L. Sch., L.A., Research Paper No. 02-15, 2002), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=317121 (surveying empirical literature regarding inde-
pendent directors and shareholder value).  
 44. See generally Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 
6542, 6542 (proposed Feb. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 228-40, 245, 249, 274), 
available at http://www.iasplus.com/usa/0601seccompensation.pdf (amendments “intended 
to provide . . . a clearer and more complete picture of [executive] compensation”). 
 45. The SEC has this to say about the possible effects on executive compensation 
practices of the new disclosure requirements: 
 We believe that the extent to which increased transparency and completeness 
in executive and director compensation disclosure would result in broader 
benefits depends at least in part on the extent to which current executive and 
director compensation practices are aligned with the interests of investors as 
reflected in their investment and voting decisions. Any changes to a company 
that might occur, including changes in corporate governance, changes in con-
trol, changes in the employment of particular executives or other changes could 
depend to some extent on the degree to which improved transparency in execu-
tive and director compensation would affect investors’ decision-making with re-
spect to that company.  
 . . . We emphasize that we are not seeking to foster any given directional or 
other impacts. Our objective is to increase transparency to enable decision-
makers to make more informed decisions, which could result in different poli-
cies or practices or increase investor confidence in existing policies or practices. 
Id. at 6591. 
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have relatively high levels of direct or indirect executive compensa-
tion, but also provide existing investors with evidence that could be 
employed in state unfairness or waste actions.”46 SEC Chairman 
Christopher Cox, commenting on the rules proposed in 2006, noted 
that disclosure of executive compensation is “ ‘at the heart of [the 
SEC’s] disclosure mission,’ ”47 that “ ‘[t]he market is capable of disci-
plining excessive compensation, provided that the market has ade-
quate information,’ ”48 and that it is “ ‘important that investors and 
consumers have all the information they need in order to obtain the 
best possible services from executives and managers at the lowest 
possible price.’ ”49
3.   Other Purposes 
 Whatever else may be debatable about the purpose of securities 
disclosure, it is quite clear that the acts were not intended to regu-
late securities based on their merits or financial soundness.50 The de-
sire to avoid merit regulation is a reflection of a belief that investors, 
not the government, should decide where capital should be in-
vested.51 According to this view, investors invest in worthless securi-
ties not because they are irrational, but because they lack informa-
tion or are defrauded.52 Once adequate information is available, 
there will be no need to regulate the quality of investments.  
 Commentators also attribute other purposes to the disclosure re-
quirements of the securities acts, such as preventing fraud and facili-
tating its detection and prosecution.53 Much of the impetus for the 
passage of the securities acts was the prevalence of misrepresenta-
tion in the stock market, either by direct falsehood or by omission,54
particularly by investment banks and underwriters.55  It is not clear, 
however, how disclosure requirements serve to prevent fraud. Pre-
sumably, someone who is willing to commit fraud in a nondisclosure 
 46. See Seligman, supra note 38, at 51. 
 47. SEC’s New Leader Shares His Views on Range of Issues, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 
2005, at A13 (published excerpts from interview with Christopher Cox, SEC Chairman). 
 48. Kara Scannell, SEC to Propose Overhaul of Rules on Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 10, 2006, at A1. 
 49. SEC’s New Leader Shares His Views on Range of Issues, supra note 47. 
 50. See generally JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 50-56, 229-
30, 565-67 (rev. ed. 1995) (describing prevailing disclosure philosophy of securities laws, as 
opposed to regulation that would have given government the power to prohibit the sale of 
unsound investments). 
 51. “The purpose of the [Act] . . . is to protect the public with the least possible inter-
ference to honest business.” President’s Message, Mar. 29, 1933, S. REP. NO. 47, 73rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1933), quoted in SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 
26, at 556-57. 
 52. SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at 562. 
 53. Seligman, supra note 38, at 18. 
 54. See id. at 18-33. 
 55. See id. at 24. 
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world will be willing to create false information once disclosure is re-
quired. However, disclosure requirements can increase the effort re-
quired to commit fraud. In order to satisfy the market’s demands 
where there are extensive disclosure requirements, defrauders must 
construct fundamental aspects of business and “present a veneer of 
plausibility.”56 The disclosure system presumably also provides ear-
lier warning that things are going wrong.57 In addition, as the 
amount of information available in the marketplace increases, the 
likelihood that individual pieces of false information will be able to 
mislead anyone decreases.58 For example, the irregularities at Enron 
were first uncovered by analysts and journalists relying on publicly 
disclosed information.59 This fact does not, however, go to prove that 
disclosure requirements can prevent fraud. 
 There are other incidental purposes to securities disclosure in ad-
dition to preventing fraud. Disclosure requirements can improve cor-
porate governance. As one commentator has noted,  
It provides directors more information by which they can evaluate 
the strength of the company and the performance of the officers; it 
strengthens the role of auditors in their own watchdog role; it en-
hances the effectiveness of shareholder voting and shareholder 
litigation as constraints on corporate governance; and it permits 
the governmental oversight agencies to perform more effectively.60
Information can also alleviate agency problems between promoters 
and managers, on the one hand, and investors, on the other.61
 56. See Larry E. Ribstein, Commentary, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77, 80 (2003). 
 57. See Seligman, supra note 38, at 56. 
 58. See Andy Kessler, Show Me the Books, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2002, at A10. 
 59. Bala G. Dharan & William R. Bufkins, Red Flags in Enron’s Reporting of Reve-
nues and Key Financial Measures, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS 97, 105-06 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004); see also John 
R. Emshwiller, Opening the Books: Corporate Disclosure Has Come a Long Way over the 
Decades, but It Still Has a Ways to Go, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2005, at R6 (noting that 
“some of the questionable activities that helped sink Enron . . . had been publicly dis-
closed by the company”). 
 60. Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Governance After Enron, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 99, 111
(2003). The 1977 Advisory Committee on disclosure adopted the view (albeit by a narrow 
margin) that the proxy rules should provide information about governance matters, be-
cause the board is the monitor of management and shareholders must be able to assess the 
board’s performance in order to make voting decisions. See SEC 1977 ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at D-22. 
 61. See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1048-50 (1995). Mahoney argues that disclosure requirements ad-
dressed to agency problems are much more likely to be effective than general information 
aimed at investor decision-making because the former facilitates bilateral bargaining while 
the latter must act in a complex web of transactions among many parties, a situation in 
which governmental intervention is not generally effective. See id. at 1089-90. 
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B.   Mechanism of Operation 
 Assuming that the goal of securities regulation is to improve the 
functioning of financial markets while protecting investors in the 
process, the mechanism by which securities disclosure accomplishes 
that goal is relatively clear precisely because the targets of the dis-
closure are participants in a well-organized market. Registration un-
der the 1933 Act makes extensive information available to investors 
prior to their decision to purchase a security being offered to the pub-
lic by the issuer.62 After an issuer files a preliminary registration 
statement and prospectus with the SEC, there is a waiting period 
during which public communications about the offered security are 
restricted.63 This waiting period prevents issuers and underwrit-
ers from engaging in aggressive, abbreviated, and misleading sell-
ing efforts while the market (or, more specifically, analysts and 
other professionals) digests the information in the preliminary 
prospectus.64 The waiting period also gives individuals time to 
consider before investing.65
 Disclosure requirements in the secondary market are governed by 
the 1934 Act.66 The 1934 Act has a different focus because it was 
thought that the investor in the secondary market did not have to be 
protected from the aggressive sales tactics used by underwriters in 
the primary market.67 As long as the information was available to a 
sufficient number of market participants to set accurate prices, it 
had accomplished its purpose.68 Thus, full periodic reports, including 
 62. This process is rather imperfect: the registration statement, which is filed with 
the SEC, provides extensive information only to those who seek it out. The prospectus, 
which must be delivered to a purchaser prior to the sale, contains less extensive informa-
tion although it is still voluminous. Certain issuers can avoid the burdensome disclosure 
requirements of the 1933 Act through private placements and shelf registrations, which 
adversely affects the efficacy of the disclosure system to some degree. In addition, the SEC 
has recently adopted a new regulatory system for “well-known seasoned issuers” that is in-
tended to reduce the burdens of registration without reducing the information available to 
the public. See Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, Exchange Act 
Release No. 52056, Investment Company Act Release No. 26993, [2005-2006 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶87,421, at 82,373 (Jul. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Securities 
Offering Reform]. 
 63. The waiting period is twenty days by statute, but that time is subject to extension 
or acceleration. See Securities Act of 1933 § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 77h (2000). 
 64. See SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at 568-69, 570. 
 65. See THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note 23, at 129-30. Thus, the complexity of the in-
vestment is supposed to be a factor in considering a request to accelerate the effective time 
of the registration statement. Id. at 78-79. 
 66.  See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 226 (3d ed. 1998). 
 67. See SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at 575; see also THE 
WHEAT REPORT, supra note 23, at 57-61 (discussing how primary market differs from sec-
ondary market); cf. THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note 23, at 50 (discussing the importance of 
information in the secondary markets). 
 68. See SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at 574-75. 
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the annual “10-K,” are filed with the SEC.69 Only abbreviated mate-
rial, such as the “glossy” annual report, is sent to shareholders.70 The 
periodic reporting system provides a minimum of available informa-
tion and “encourage[s] willingness on the part of issuers to keep the 
market place informed.”71
 The content of required securities disclosure is determined by the 
SEC through the usual rulemaking process, which includes opportu-
nity for public comment. The SEC has made efforts to reduce the 
burden of disclosure on some issuers72 and to streamline disclosure 
requirements—for example, by adopting in 1982 the integrated dis-
closure system for the 1933 and 1934 Acts.73 As a general rule, how-
ever, the amount of information required to be disclosed has increased 
over the years.74 Although fraud liability under the acts is limited to 
material misrepresentations or omissions, there is no requirement 
that information subject to mandatory disclosure be material.75
 How is all this information expected to improve the market and 
protect investors? Ideally, investors would receive it, carefully ana-
lyze it, and make investment decisions based on their analysis. Their 
market activity would then move security prices to more accurate le-
vels. However, few investors have the time or expertise to make ap-
propriate use of the available information. Therefore, an essential 
part of the mechanism by which securities disclosure operates to im-
prove the function of the market and protect investors is the activity of 
intermediaries. There are two kinds of intermediaries in the securities 
markets, financial intermediaries and informational intermediaries.  
 Market-makers and other professional investors determine the 
prices at which securities trade, and therefore it is the information 
 69. See Form 10-K Annual Report Pursuant to §13 or 15(d) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (Instruction D), 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶31,101, at 22,062 (de-
scribing filing requirement). 
 70. See Rule 14c-3 under the Securities Exchange Act, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶24,203 (describing information to be included in Annual Report); Form 10-K (Instruction 
G(2)), Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶31,101, at 22,063 (allowing incorporation by reference to 
annual report to security holders). 
 71. THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note 23, at 332. 
 72. See, e.g., Small Business Initiatives, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,442 (Aug. 13, 1992) (simplify-
ing requirements for small businesses). 
 73. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383, 
Exchange Act Release No. 18524, Public Utility Holding Company Act Release No. 22407, 
Trust Indenture Act Release No. 700, Investment Company Act Release No. 12264, [Ac-
counting Series Releases 1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,328, at 
62,990 (Mar. 3, 1982). 
 74. The recent overhaul of registration requirements does not reduce the amount of 
information disclosed; rather, it streamlines the process for “well-known seasoned issuers” 
on the assumption that adequate information is already available to the market. See Secu-
rities Offering Reform, supra note 62, at 82,373. 
 75. Information is “material” under the securities acts when “there is a substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important” in making a deci-
sion. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
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available to them that determines the accuracy of those prices.76 If 
those prices are accurate, even investors who completely ignore the 
disclosed information will nevertheless be protected if they trade on 
the basis of price.77 The market itself is therefore a financial inter-
mediary.78 Moreover, mutual funds and other managed investments 
allow unsophisticated investors to channel their investment activity 
through professional financial intermediaries. 
 Like financial intermediaries, informational intermediaries are 
essential to the functioning of the securities disclosure system. These 
actors select, analyze, and disseminate a more manageable version of 
disclosed information.79 Securities analysts, portfolio managers, the 
financial press, rating agencies (who tend to provide useful selection 
and formatting functions), and “registered representatives” such as 
brokers and financial advisors all provide digested information to the 
general public or unsophisticated investor.80 In 1973, 46.8% of inves-
tors reported using stockbrokers for information they used in in-
vestment decisions, another 15.6% used advisory services, and 9.7% 
got their information from friends and relatives.81 Although the use 
of professional advice has declined, intermediaries are still impor-
tant. In 2002, 51% of investors owning individual stocks (other than 
through employer-sponsored retirement plans) said they relied on 
advice from a professional financial advisor when making investment 
decisions.82 Therefore, the integrity and competence of the dissemina-
tors is essential.83 Not surprisingly, both issuers and the SEC consider 
 76. See generally Paul G. Mahoney, Market Microstructure and Market Efficiency, 28 
J. CORP. L. 541 (2003) (discussing the complex mechanism occurring within the market by 
market-makers and others); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach 
to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2378 (1998) (noting that institutional inves-
tors are better able to process market information than the SEC and have more financial 
incentives to do so). 
 77. In the vocabulary of the mechanisms of market efficiency, intermediaries create 
“professionally informed trading” and “derivatively informed trading,” that is, trading by 
those who observe price shifts caused by professionally informed traders. See Ronald J. 
Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: 
The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 721 (2003). 
 78. See Hu, supra note 35, at 1355. 
 79. See SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at xi; Stephen J. 
Choi, A Framework for the Regulation of Securities Market Intermediaries, 1 BERKELEY 
BUS. L.J. 45, 46-47 (2004). 
 80. See SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at D-9, 312-14, 564 
n.11; THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note 23, at 10, 52-54. 
 81. See SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at 243-44. 
 82. See INV. CO. INST. & SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA 77 (2002). 
The percentages were higher for investors who owned stock through employer-sponsored 
retirement plans or who owned mutual funds. Id. at 87, 95. 
 83. See Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Be-
havioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 166-70 (2002) (describ-
ing analysts’ biases); see also THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note 23, at 319-23 (discussing ob-
ligations of broker-dealers to investigate and consult information before making recom-
mendations). Before the promulgation of Regulation Financial Disclosure (FD), which re-
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the needs of analysts and other professionals in designing disclosure 
requirements and preparing disclosure documents.84
 If the goal of securities disclosure is not to improve market opera-
tion and investor decision-making, but rather to deter lawful con-
duct, the mechanism by which disclosure will accomplish that goal is 
somewhat different. Disclosure still operates by affecting the market, 
but in this case an important additional feature of the market is 
competition. For example, investors may pay more for shares of com-
panies with audit committee experts, which would encourage all 
companies to appoint such experts.85 Regulation Analyst Certifica-
tion (AC), which requires analysts to disclose their compensation and 
to certify that they actually believe the views they express, is in-
tended to improve the quality of analysts’ research by creating com-
petition between analysts based on the absence of compensation-
related conflicts of interest.86 Similarly, the SEC’s proposed rules on 
enhanced disclosure to investors in mutual funds are intended to 
promote better-informed investment decision-making in light of the 
perceived lack of adequate information available to investors about 
distribution-related costs and arrangements that create conflicts of 
interest between investors and brokers.87 The availability of such in-
formation will presumably allow investors to select funds based on 
quires that any material nonpublic information disclosed to securities market professionals 
or securityholders also be disclosed to the public, corporate executives could use informa-
tion as a commodity to influence particular analysts or investors. See Selective Disclosure 
and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange Act Release No. 43154, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 24599, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 86,319, at 83,677 (Aug. 15, 2000); cf. Deborah Solomon & Robert Frank, ‘You
Don’t Like Our Stock? You Are Off the List’—SEC Sets New Front on Conflicts by Taking 
Aim at Companies that Retaliate Against Analysts, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2003, at C1 (de-
scribing practice by some firms of punishing analysts who make negative reports about 
their stock).
 84. See SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at 5, 11. 
 85. This seems an implausible scenario. More likely, the SEC is relying on some repu-
tational mechanism for this particular goal. Cf. Joann S. Lublin & Kara Scannell, They 
Say Jump: SEC Plans Tougher Pay Rules, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2006, at C1 (quoting for-
mer SEC Chief Accountant Lynn Turner that disclosure of executive compensation will not 
reduce compensation unless shareholders act on the information). 
 86. See Regulation Analyst Certification, Securities Act Release No. 8193, Exchange 
Act Release No. 47384, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶86,833, at 
87,247 (Feb. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Regulation Analyst Certification]. The disclosure is also 
intended to allow investors to better determine the quality of an analyst’s research. See id.;
see also SELIGMAN, supra note 50, at 372-73 (describing effort in 1960s to use disclosure to 
improve competition in mutual funds). 
 87. Proposed Rule: Confirmation Requirements and Point of Sale Disclosure Re-
quirements for Transactions in Certain Mutual Funds and Other Securities, and Other 
Confirmation Requirement Amendments, and Amendments to the Registration Form for 
Mutual Funds, Securities Act Release No. 8358, Exchange Act Release No. 49148, Invest-
ment Act Release No. 26341, [2003-2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
87,135, at 89,008 (Jan. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Proposed Rule: Mutual Fund Disclosure]. 
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those criteria and thereby pressure funds to change their policies.88
C.   Limitations on Effectiveness 
 Despite the fact that securities disclosure is almost universally es-
teemed as a model for regulation by disclosure, there are important 
limits to its effectiveness. First, disclosure will only be useful if its 
recipients can process and understand the disclosed information.89
This is a particular problem for equity markets, which have exten-
sive participation by ordinary citizens in transactions involving in-
creasingly complex financial arrangements.90 The SEC and others 
involved in financial disclosure are therefore seeking to improve the 
usefulness of disclosure by more carefully designing the format of in-
formation.91 In 1998, the SEC adopted rules requiring disclosure 
documents to be written in “plain English.”92 The proposed changes 
to the executive compensation disclosure requirements are specifi-
cally intended to make the information easily understandable.93 In 
proposing mutual fund fee and commission disclosure, the SEC spe-
cifically addressed and solicited comments on the format of the in-
formation94 and the timing and form of the disclosure. These con-
cerns would be lessened, of course, if disclosure were targeted di-
rectly to intermediaries. The SEC’s focus on investor protection, 
however, requires that investors still be considered the audience 
for disclosed information. 
 The ability of financial intermediaries to serve their role in setting 
accurate prices depends on the market being efficient—that is, on 
prices reflecting available information. But the market may not be ef-
 88. For a sharp criticism of the SEC’s mutual fund disclosure regime, see Hu, supra
note 35. 
 89. See THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note 23, at 78-80; William O. Douglas, Protecting
the Investor, 23 YALE REV. 521, 523-24 (1934). 
 90. See Douglas, supra note 89, at 527 (noting that equity investments are by their 
nature risky and complicated and arguing that it will be almost impossible to write an un-
derstandable prospectus about them); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure 
Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 12-19 (arguing that some 
transactions may be too complex for a disclosure system to regulate); see also Jesse Eis-
inger, Ahead of the Tape: Misunderstood, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2003, at C1 (noting that 
“[i]t’s not a coincidence that some of the biggest blowups, like Enron and Tyco Interna-
tional, have been hard [for analysts] to cover”). 
 91. See Hu, supra note 35, at 1345 (describing effort to design useful format for 
information). 
 92. See generally Plain English Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 7497, Ex-
change Act Release No. 39593, Investment Company Act Release No. 23011, [1998 Trans-
fer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶86,003, at 80,127 (Jan. 28, 1998) (requiring prospec-
tuses to be written in plain English). 
 93. Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 6542, 
6542 (proposed Feb. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 228-40, 245, 249, 274), avail-
able at http://www.iasplus.com/usa/0601seccompensation.pdf (amendments “intended 
to provide . . . a clearer and more complete picture of [executive] compensation”). 
 94. See Proposed Rule: Mutual Fund Disclosure, supra note 87, at 89,008. 
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ficient, and there may be limits to the ability of market professionals 
to perform the price-setting role assigned to them.95 In addition, heu-
ristic biases96 can create bounded rationality in professionals as well 
as in ordinary investors.97 Because the number of shares of a security 
outstanding and available to be traded (that is, the size of the “float”) 
determines the efficiency of the market for that security, prices of 
small issues will be less accurate even with active intermediaries.98
Arbitrage opportunities, which are essential for efficient markets, 
may be limited.99 Moreover, an increasing proportion of investment 
dollars is being placed in portfolios, such as index funds, that are re-
stricted to a specific bundle of stocks for diversification purposes; 
those holders, which may own a very large number of shares, cannot 
influence the market by their trading behavior.100
 There are also, as we have seen in the past several years, prob-
lems with basic informational institutions: managers have incentives 
to distort information; reputational intermediaries, such as account-
ants and lawyers, fail to serve the oversight function expected of 
them; and analysts have conflicts of interest.101 Moreover, securities 
analysts do not always do extensive research and sometimes do not 
understand the companies they are reviewing.102 Financial informa-
tion is increasingly available from a variety of sources of questionable 
reliability at an astonishing speed. Improved access to information, 
however, may simply give people the chance to be foolish faster.103
 95. See, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 77, at 723-35 (describing challenges 
to the mechanisms of market efficiency posed by investor irrationality and limited ar-
bitrage opportunities). 
 96. See infra notes 151-59 and accompanying text. 
 97. See ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL 
FINANCE 12-13 (2000); Schwarcz, supra note 90, at 17-19. For an exploration of the limits 
on rational behavior by investors generally, see Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regu-
lation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J.
1397, 1454-89 (2002); see also Langevoort, supra note 83, at 154-55 (providing examples).   
 98. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 77, at 735-36. 
 99. See id.; see also SHLEIFER, supra note 97, at 13-16, 51-52, 89-90. 
 100. See Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered 
Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 47304, Investment Company Act Release No. 25922, [2002-2003 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,826, at 87,144-45 (Jan. 31, 2003) [hereinafter 
Proxy Voting Policies].  
 101. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 77, at 736-37; see also supra note 83 (describ-
ing corporate influence on analysts). 
 102. See Harvey L. Pitt, How to Prevent Future Enrons, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2001, at 
A18; see also Langevoort, supra note 83, at 149-52 (discussing limits on financial analyst 
performance, including agency costs and heuristic biases such as overconfidence, and ques-
tioning whether analysts have any effect on the market at all). 
 103. See EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL 
SPECULATION 237-40 (1999); Donald C. Langevoort, Technological Evolution and the Devo-
lution of Corporate Financial Reporting, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 7-10 (2004). Further-
more, Regulation FD is specifically intended to bring directly to the public information that 
was previously filtered through intermediaries. See supra note 83. 
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 Also, recent advances in technology may lead investors to rely less 
on professional advice and to rely instead on raw or untested data 
from the Internet104 or to follow investment trends blindly (otherwise 
known as engaging in “herd behavior”) because they are incapable of 
making reasoned decisions in an increasingly complex environ-
ment.105 It is now much easier, and cheaper, for small investors to 
purchase securities without the assistance of a professional. Publicity 
about analysts’ conflicts of interest and the unreliability of their rec-
ommendations may also contribute to a decline in the use of profes-
sional advice.106 The result of these trends may be, perversely, to de-
crease the effectiveness of securities disclosure by eliminating its 
primary mechanism, the filtering and processing of complex informa-
tion by sophisticated financial professionals. In addition, a decline in 
the use of intermediaries by individual investors may also adversely 
affect the price-setting function of market professionals, because it 
may increase “noise trading” as investors react to information in un-
sophisticated ways.107
 Finally, the availability and comprehensibility of disclosed infor-
mation is insufficient to make information useful if it does not relate 
to an issue considered salient by its intended audience, whether the 
audience is individual investors or intermediaries. One commentator 
has suggested that stock option expense was ignored by financial 
analysts not because the information was unavailable or because it 
was too speculative but because it was not interesting: analysts cared 
only about earnings.108 It remains to be seen whether increased 
disclosure about corporate governance practices will prove salient 
to investors and intermediaries.109 Information that is not salient 
to analysts and other financial intermediaries will not provide the 
benefits envisioned by the disclosure system, no matter how 
clearly it is disclosed.  
D.   Substitution for Direct Regulation 
 As indicated above, a supplemental purpose of securities regula-
tion is the regulation of lawful behavior. To the extent disclosure is 
aimed at this purpose, it is attempting to substitute for direct regula-
tion. The SEC’s director-nomination proposals provide a clear exam-
 104. Langevoort, supra note 83, at 154. 
 105. See Schwarcz, supra note 90, at 15. 
 106. As of 2002, reliance on professional investment advice had declined markedly 
from levels reported in 1973. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. 
 107. See Langevoort, supra note 103, at 9; Langevoort, supra note 83, at 172-75. 
 108. Comments of Susan Lee, Wall Street Journal Editorial Board (CNBC television 
broadcast Aug. 9, 2002). 
 109. See Ken Brown & Robin Sidel, Scoring Boards on Governance Has Its Risks, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 2, 2002, at C1; Plitch, supra note 43; see also Bainbridge, supra note 43, at 16-17.  
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ple of this phenomenon. In response to a perceived unwillingness by 
corporations to respond to shareholders’ concerns, the SEC proposed 
to create a new substantive right allowing shareholders to nominate 
directors under certain circumstances.110 The proposal received wide-
spread criticism and was shelved. In its place the SEC adopted a dis-
closure-based regulation, with the stated goals of increasing investor 
“understanding” of the director nomination process and permitting 
investors to evaluate the nominating committee of the board.111 The 
SEC also described a goal of “increasing security holder understand-
ing of . . . board accountability, board responsiveness, and . . . corpo-
rate governance policies,”112 policies that would appear to be outside 
the usual market-enhancing purpose of securities disclosure.  
 Similarly, the SEC has required that mutual funds disclose their 
proxy voting policies and actual voting practices, purportedly to en-
hance “transparency” but also to encourage mutual funds to exert 
more pressure on management of the companies whose stock they 
own and thereby to improve corporate governance.113 Most recently, 
the proposed changes to disclosure requirements for executive com-
pensation are expressly intended not only to increase “transparency” 
but also to enable the “market” to “discipline” excessive compensa-
tion.114 In other words, where the SEC does not have the authority or 
the political will to regulate directly, it can use a disclosure system to 
accomplish the underlying regulatory goal through the actions of in-
termediaries and investors in the financial markets.  
 In sum, securities disclosure has three goals: protecting investors 
 110. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48626, Invest-
ment Company Act Release No. 26206, [2003-2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 87,101, at 88,401 (Oct. 14, 2003). 
111.  Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communications Be-
tween Security Holders and Boards of Directors, Securities Act Release No. 8340, Ex-
change Act Release No. 48825, Investment Company Act Release No. 26262, [2003-2004 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,116, at 88,719, 88,722 (Nov. 24, 2004). 
 112. See id. at 88,722. The reaction of commenters about whether actual improvement 
was likely to occur was mixed. See id.
 113. The SEC has stated that requiring funds to disclose their proxy voting policies 
will “enable fund shareholders to monitor their funds’ involvement in the governance ac-
tivities of portfolio companies, which may have a dramatic impact on shareholder value.” 
Proxy Voting Policies, supra note 100, at 87,144. Similarly, the SEC has opined that insti-
tutions holding shares as fiduciaries would violate their fiduciary duty under the Invest-
ment Advisers Act by having a policy of always voting with management. See Proxy Voting 
by Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2106, [2003 Transfer Bind-
er] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶86,825, at 87,132 (Jan. 31, 2003). The SEC has sent a clear 
message that it wants not simply to make shareholder activism possible, but to “encourage 
funds to become more engaged in corporate governance of issuers held in their portfolios, 
which may benefit all investors and not just fund shareholders.” Proxy Voting Policies, su-
pra note 100, at 87,146; see also Ken Brown, Vanguard Gives Corporate Chiefs a Report 
Card, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2003, at C1 (describing Vanguard’s recent willingness to vote 
against cooperate management). 
 114. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.  
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by improving their decision-making; improving the price-setting 
function of the market; and, sometimes, altering firms’ behavior. It is 
able to accomplish at least the first two of those goals because it op-
erates in an ideal environment: the capital markets and related fi-
nancial institutions. A wide variety of intermediaries and a (rela-
tively) efficient market combine to process the disclosed information 
and turn it into a single signal, the price of a security, which can 
then be used by investors in making investment decisions. The na-
ture of investing is such that investors are likely to be as rational as 
anyone ever is, even if that rationality is significantly imperfect. In 
addition, investors often seek expert advice. Thus, the context in 
which securities disclosure serves as regulation is quite unusual. For 
example, none of these features are available for a consumer deciding 
to purchase a refrigerator or a salad dressing.115
IV.   DISCLOSURE AS REGULATION
 There are many, extremely varied examples of uses of disclosure 
as regulation in contexts other than securities law. Their purposes 
also vary, although most are intended either to reduce information 
asymmetries in an existing market or to change someone’s behavior. 
The mechanisms by which they operate or are intended to operate 
are rarely explicit, and an examination of those mechanisms reveals 
some of the disadvantages and limitations of disclosure systems. 
A.   Purposes 
1.   Providing Information in an Existing Market 
 Many disclosure schemes are intended simply to provide informa-
tion to decision-makers who are presumed to have a preexisting need 
for the information, usually because they are about to engage in an 
economic transaction in some market.116 The disclosure system seeks 
to improve the ability of that market to aggregate preferences and ef-
ficiently set prices.117 Information asymmetries impede market effi-
ciency and result in a great deal of economic activity directed at 
 115. But see Strassel, supra note 4 (quoting SEC Chair Christopher Cox that his goal 
for the disclosure system is “for consumers to be able to make the same sort of comparison 
they can do when they are buying a car or other products” and marveling at the prospect of 
“[a]n America that isn’t scared to invest, but views a visit to the SEC web site as akin to 
browsing Consumer Reports”). 
 116. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Eco-
nomics, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 460, 470 (2002) (describing situations in which actors react 
to information asymmetries). 
 117. The ability of an actor to make rational decisions depends on the actor’s knowing 
the possible outcomes and their probabilities. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Domain of 
Preference, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 717, 719-20 (2003) (describing decision-making under cer-
tainty, risk, and uncertainty). 
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searching for information.118 Disclosure requirements can improve 
the efficiency of a market by increasing the information available to 
market participants and reducing search costs.119 Moreover, disclo-
sure provides market participants with the information they need to 
make rational decisions, as opposed to following the herd.120 In mar-
kets with imperfect information, market actions themselves convey 
information. In an effort to exploit this fact, market participants al-
ter their behavior and affect the function of the market.121 Informa-
tion can reduce this effect. Thus, requiring122 the disclosure of infor-
mation can reduce search costs in economic transactions, improve the 
efficiency of markets, and provide other social benefits as a conse-
quence of these economic benefits.123
 Real estate disclosure requirements are an example of market-
facilitating disclosure. These laws, which require sellers of residen-
tial properties to disclose certain information to buyers, reduce in-
formational asymmetries between the usually knowledgeable seller 
and the usually uninformed buyer.124 Nutrition labeling is also in 
part aimed at redressing information asymmetries, albeit on a much 
smaller scale. Although they do not operate in an economic market, 
campaign finance disclosure laws address informational asymme-
 118. See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 213, 
224 (1961). Institutions and mechanisms can be developed to facilitate search but igno-
rance can never be completely eliminated. Id. at 224. Stigler also noted that reputation has 
value because it decreases search costs. Id.
 119. See Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein, Information, Fairness, and Effi-
ciency in Bargaining, in PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE 155, 155 (Barbara A. 
Mellers & Jonathan Baron eds., 1993); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 77, at 721 (indicat-
ing that markets respond more efficiently to public information). Lack of information may 
result in market failure to the extent it prevents participants from pricing risk. See MAGAT 
& VISCUSI, supra note 17, at 4. However, there are limits to the ability of information to 
make markets efficient. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 77, at 736-37. 
 120. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U.
CINN. L. REV. 1023, 1041 (2000). 
 121. See Stiglitz, supra note 116, at 469-70, 473; see also Camerer & Loewenstein, su-
pra note 119, at 157-59 (describing negotiating practices such as strategic delay and stra-
tegic representation of one’s own position). 
 122. Mandatory, rather than voluntary, disclosure is necessary to facilitate market 
transactions because it is difficult for the creator of information to appropriate the benefits 
of that information to herself, and therefore some desirable information either will not be 
generated or will not be disseminated. See Stiglitz, supra note 116, at 463. Also, just as 
there are those who will want to create and publish information, there are those who will 
want to prevent creation and publication. See id. at 463, 473. Mandatory disclosure can 
also help to ensure that information is credible and therefore more useful, see Paul Pe-
corino & Mark Van Boening, An Empirical Analysis of Bargaining with Voluntary Trans-
mission of Private Information, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 153 (2004), and that information 
that might otherwise be generated on an individual basis is standardized and therefore 
more useful for comparisons. See Sage, supra note 7, at 1741-42. 
 123. According to Stiglitz, for example, governmental “[r]ight-to-know” laws have been 
“an important if imperfect check on government abuses.” See Stiglitz, supra note 116, at 488. 
 124. See Florrie Young Roberts, Disclosure Duties in Real Estate Sales and Attempts to 
Reallocate the Risk, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1, 19 (2001).  
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tries; they are intended to provide information to voters to make 
them more “competent”—that is, more informed and therefore better 
able to ensure that their votes match their preferences.125 This use of 
disclosure is not aimed at altering the outcome of decisions, only at 
improving the decision-making process, and it can be used in a wide 
variety of nonmarket and market contexts, including labor markets, 
capital markets, and product markets. 
2.   Regulating Lawful Conduct 
 The other common goal of disclosure-based regulation is altering 
lawful behavior, such as the production of pollutants,126 the use of la-
bor practices,127 the use of agricultural techniques,128 the production 
of household goods and services,129 and even food consumption.130 A 
similar goal is to improve the quality or reduce the price of an exist-
ing product or service. Health care disclosure systems such as hospi-
tal “report cards” are intended to improve quality,131 as are restau-
rant hygiene disclosure requirements.132 Recent proposals to post the 
prices charged by health care providers are intended to lower the 
costs of health care.133 These requirements are also aimed at infor-
mational asymmetries but with the expectation that remedying those 
asymmetries will result not only in better decision-making but in 
better decisions and better behavior. 
3.   Providing Information for Government Operations 
 Some disclosure requirements are intended to be used by and im-
 125. See Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign 
Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295, 296 (2005). 
 126. For example, the Toxic Releases Inventory (TRI), 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2000), re-
quires firms to disclose releases of specified toxic substances. See Karkkainen, supra note 
11, at 286. The information is standardized and publicly available. See id. The TRI is con-
sidered a resounding success; toxic releases have fallen nearly in half since creation of the 
TRI. See id. at 287-88. 
 127. See David J. Doorey, Who Made That?: Influencing Foreign Labour Practices Through 
Reflexive Domestic Disclosure Regulation, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353, 355-57 (2005). 
 128. See Margaret Gilhooley, Reexamining the Labeling for Biotechnology in Foods: 
The Species Connection, 82 NEB. L. REV. 1088, 1101-02 (2004). 
 129. See Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE § 25249.6 (West 1999) (requiring products to carry labels if they contain substances 
“known to the state [of California] to cause cancer”). 
 130. The Nutrition Education and Labeling Act of 1990, 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2000), re-
quires food processors to label their products with information about specified nutrients. 
The format for the information is standardized, and the Food and Drug Administration 
oversees the details of nutrition labeling. See 21 C.F.R. pt 101 (2006). 
 131. See Sage, supra note 7, at 1707-10, 1715-20. 
132. See generally Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie, The Effect of Information on Product 
Quality: Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards, 118 Q.J. ECON. 409, 410 (2003) 
(describing requirement that restaurants post hygiene report cards and its effect). 
 133. See Vanessa Fuhrmans, Insurer Reveals What Doctors Really Charge, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 18, 2005, at D1. 
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prove the operation of the government itself. Regulators need infor-
mation to design and enforce direct regulation systems.134 This in-
formation may not be broadly published,135 although such informa-
tion is increasingly available electronically to anyone who looks for 
it.136 Disclosure intended to inform citizens or consumers about their 
legal rights137 is also in a sense aimed at improving the function of an 
existing legal regime by reducing information asymmetries between 
the government and the people.  
4.   Improving Management or Firm Performance 
 Other disclosure regimes are intended to improve the performance 
of managers, either by providing information that can be used to 
monitor agents,138 by creating information that managers would oth-
erwise not have available to them,139 or by forcing firms to confront 
the facts by forcing them to gather data. Management theory sug-
gests that managers “manage what [they] measure”;140 that is, man-
agers will pay attention to things they are forced to keep track of.141
Confidential internal reporting of hospital medical mistakes can pro-
vide “a knowledge base for hospital managers to use in carrying out 
safety improvements.”142 Information can also lead to improved coop-
eration between firms.143 The disclosure obligations that accompany 
the patent process fall into this category; they make information pub-
licly available that other parties can use to advance their own re-
search and thereby facilitate a kind of involuntary interfirm coopera-
 134. See Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 283-86. 
 135. An example of this is the Animal Welfare Act § 10, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2140 (2000), which 
requires laboratories to retain records for government inspection. See Sunstein, supra note 
8, at 622. 
 136. See e.g., Sage, supra note 7, at 1799. 
 137. See id. at 1765-66. 
 138. See Eric Talley, Disclosure Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1956 (2001). 
 139. See Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 297-300 (describing how information might im-
prove management); see also Charlotte Villiers, Disclosure Obligations in Company Law: 
Bringing Communication Theory into the Fold, 1 J. CORP. L. STUD. 181, 199-200 (2001) 
(describing need for information within organizations). Theoretically, information that is 
valuable to management will be produced, since there can be no market failure within the 
firm, but agency problems might result in underproduction of internal information. 
Moreover, a disclosure requirement that provides information about other firms can im-
prove management by providing benchmarks for improvement. See Karkkainen, supra
note 11, at 261. 
 140. Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 295, 297-300; Louis Loewenstein, Financial Trans-
parency and Corporate Governance: You Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
1335, 1342-45 (1996); Sage, supra note 7, at 1778 n.285; Williams, supra note 36, at 1294-
96; Troy Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Se-
curities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 465 (2003). 
 141. The SEC may have had this phenomenon in mind when it suggested that requir-
ing analysts to certify their recommendations will cause them to use more care in making 
those recommendations. See Regulation Analyst Certification, supra note 86, at ¶87,247. 
 142. GRAHAM, supra note 7, at 1. 
 143. See Sage, supra note 7, at 1771-78. 
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tion.144 A rather odd example of a disclosure obligation intended to 
improve management is the recent change in SEC rules requiring 
disclosure of correspondence between a company and a director who 
resigned as the result of a dispute.145 According to then-Chairman 
Harvey Pitt, knowing that disclosure will be required will give direc-
tors “more leverage to raise their issues and concerns, and to be more 
effective in doing so,”146 presumably leading to more effective board 
decision-making. 
5.   Increasing Public Awareness 
 In all these cases, the regulator generally assumes that there is a 
need for, or at least an interest in, the information to be disclosed. In 
some cases, however, the disclosure requirement may be an attempt 
to generate interest in the information itself.147 The SEC’s continuing 
attempts to improve the disclosure of executive compensation148 may 
reflect its hope that eventually investors will start paying atten-
tion to the matter. The “Made in the USA” garment label and the 
earlier “ILGWU”149 label probably were intended, at least in part, 
to raise consumers’ awareness of the conditions under which prod-
ucts are produced.  
6.   Unidentified Purposes 
 A few disclosure schemes, such as drinking water quality reports, 
are enacted with no obvious goal.150 Such schemes are usually said to 
 144. See also Sharon Begley, In Switch, Scientists Share Data to Develop Useful Drug 
Therapies, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2006, at A9 (describing disclosure requirement imposed by 
foundations supporting medical research, which is intended to result in earlier cooperation 
between researchers and clinicians). 
 145. See Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing 
Date, Securities Act Release No. 8400, Exchange Act Release No. 49424, [2003-2004 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,158, at 89,508 (Mar. 16, 2004).  
 146. Phyllis Plitch, Full Disclosure: New SEC Rules Reveal the Corporate Underbelly,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2005, at B4B. 
 147. This effect can be unintended. The disclosure of phenylketonurics (the presence of 
NutraSweet) on food labels has generated both curiosity and concern. A Google search 
for “phenylketonurics” turned up a number of panicked postings to bulletin boards 
asking why the government would require that it be disclosed if it wasn’t dangerous. 
According to one response, phenylketonurics disclosure is directed at those with a dis-
order making consumption of phenylalanine dangerous. See Ask the Doc, 
http://www.wwu.edu/chw/ask_the_doc/post/1-1000/0537.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2007); 
see also Kevin Helliker, To Warn or Not to Warn, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2005, at R7 (describ-
ing consumers’ reaction (avoiding string beans) to a warning against consumption of fava 
beans by children, which causes illness in rare cases). 
 148. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text. 
 149. International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union. Mature readers may remember 
“look for the union label” television advertisements. 
 150. See, e.g., MODEL COURT RULE ON INSURANCE DISCLOSURE, supra note 3. The pur-
pose of the Model Rule, which requires that attorneys disclose their malpractice coverage, 
is “to provide a potential client with access to relevant information related to a lawyer’s re-
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provide important information, but the utility of the information may 
not be clear. The sex offender registration acts151 are an interesting 
example. Their stated purpose is to protect the public by informing 
citizens about the presence of sex offenders.152 The citizens are then 
expected to take whatever precautions they deem appropriate, pre-
sumably including keeping their children indoors but presumably not 
including killing the sex offender.153 Perhaps the purpose of the laws 
is actually to cause so much harassment that the sex offender leaves 
town.154 Or registration may result in the offender’s choosing to settle 
in another state after release from prison.155 There is some evidence 
that this was in fact the intended purpose of the statutes and that 
they in fact operate as intended to some degree.156
B.   Impediments to Information-Based Regulation 
 Even where the purposes of a disclosure requirement are rela-
tively clear, however, the mechanism by which the disclosure is ex-
pected to accomplish its goal is rarely explained. Moreover, an ex-
amination of the mechanism by which a disclosure scheme operates 
often reveals ambiguities in the purpose of the scheme as well. How-
ever, before we can consider how the disclosure of information can 
accomplish a regulatory goal, it is helpful to understand three fun-
presentation in order to make an informed decision about whether to hire a particular law-
yer.” Id. However, three states have required that attorneys report their coverage to the 
bar but have not made that information available to the public. See AM. BAR ASS’N, STATE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF ABA MODEL COURT RULE ON INSURANCE DISCLOSURE (2006), avail-
able at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/clientpro/malprac_disc_chart.pdf. 
 151. Every state currently has some version of a sex offender registration act, which 
generally requires a person convicted of specified sex offenses to register with law en-
forcement officials where the offender lives following release from incarceration. Smith 
v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89-90 (2003). There is also a Federal counterpart, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 
(2000). Some of the relevant information is made available to the public. Smith, 538 U.S. 
at 91.  
 152. Smith, 538 U.S. at 99, 101. 
 153. Id. at 101, 105 (noting that the sex offender registration web site included a warn-
ing that using the information contained therein to commit a crime against any person was 
subject to criminal prosecution); see also Editorial, Knowledge Protects: Online Sex Of-
fender Registries Are Vital, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, April 28, 2006, at 22A (noting that it 
is not clear how the registries have protected anyone but arguing that publication of of-
fender information is “vital”). 
 154. Cf. Smith, 538 U.S. at 100-01 (describing alleged harassment of a registered 
sex offender). 
 155. This, however, merely transfers the risk to other people, especially if the sex of-
fender, having learned a lesson, fails to re-register after a move. Cf. Scott v. Shepard, 
(1773) 96 Eng. Rep. 525, 525-26 (K.B.) (describing the throwing of a “lighted squib” into a 
marketplace and the subsequent repeated throwing of the squib to avoid injury to self). 
Eventually, however, every state will have similar registration requirements and the stat-
utes will no longer be able to accomplish this goal. 
 156. See Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, 
and Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1854-57 (2005). If this is true, 
then the laws may be said to act in a kind of interstate market for desirable residents. 
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damental limitations on any information-based system. The first is 
the ability of individuals to process information, the second is the 
way information affects individuals’ behavior, and the third is the 
way information affects firms’ behavior. 
 In the past few decades, scholars in several disciplines have de-
veloped a more nuanced understanding of the way individuals react 
to information. They have identified a number of predictable cogni-
tive biases created by our limited ability to process information.157
While a complete discussion of this literature is beyond the scope of 
this Article, some heuristic biases are particularly relevant to the op-
eration of disclosure systems. The availability bias, for example, 
leads people to respond to information based on the “ease with which 
instances or associations could be brought to mind.”158 Thus, people 
will overestimate the risk of an accident after seeing or hearing 
about such an accident.159 While disclosure requirements can present 
novel and therefore theoretically more “available” information, that 
information may not in fact be used unless it is also brought to the 
direct attention of the decision-maker.  
 The “anchoring” bias results in a failure to adjust fully to new in-
formation.160 Anchoring can be made worse by self-serving biases, 
which prevent people from accepting or adjusting to information that 
adversely affects their personal interests or contradicts their preex-
isting beliefs.161 Moreover, people tend to be more easily persuaded 
by oral communications or communications that engage the emotions 
than by written or abstract information.162 These biases are reflected 
in the fact that people often accept information from unreliable 
sources163 and that anecdotes are often far more influential than sta-
 157. See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel 
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). 
 158. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Fre-
quency and Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, su-
pra note 157, at 163, 163-64; see also Prentice, supra note 97, at 1469-70 (noting that 
“while making decisions, people tend to concentrate on facts that are ‘available’ in 
their memories”); Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
1, 3-5 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (describing various kinds of biases, including the 
availability bias). 
 159. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 158, at 178. 
 160. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 157, 
at 3, 14-18; see also Bainbridge, supra note 120, at 1043-49 (discussing status quo bias and 
endowment effect); Prentice, supra note 97, at 1483 (stating that people often do not suffi-
ciently adjust to new information). 
 161. See Michael Ross & Fiore Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution,
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 157, at 179, 179-
82; Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 119, at 164-67 (noting the significant role-
dependent differences in assessment of “fair” settlement of tort case). 
 162. See Prentice, supra note 97, at 1467-69. 
 163. See Langevoort, supra note 83, at 156-63 (discussing trading behavior in response 
to Internet chatter). 
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tistics in decision-making.164 Finally, decision-makers often engage in 
“herd behavior,” which occurs when they behave in accordance with 
what they perceive to be the behavior of others rather than engaging 
in independent decision-making.165
 Another well-studied limit on the ability of information to affect 
behavior is the “information overload” phenomenon.166 This phe-
nomenon occurs when an excess of information causes a decision-
maker to reject or ignore useful information and instead make an ill-
informed decision.167 An increase in the usefulness of information 
leads to better decisions, but more information in general leads to 
higher costs of processing the information by the decision-maker. So, 
increasing the amount of useful information available can actually 
result in an individual’s making worse decisions as the costs of proc-
essing new information become too great.168 Moreover, as information 
quality improves, people tend to use more of the information avail-
able. Research indicates that as decision-makers increase the 
amount of information they use, their decisions at first improve but 
then tend to get worse.169 Thus, an increase in the quality but not the 
quantity of information available can also lead to information over-
load, as decision-makers are enticed, by its quality, to try to use more 
of the available information.170
 Studies have also shown that decision-makers who have useless or 
irrelevant information may make worse decisions than those with no 
information at all,171 and when there is much information available, 
people appear to make better decisions when they use some but not 
all the available information about the relevant attributes of the sub-
ject of the decision.172 Because the format of information can cause or 
 164. See Richard E. Nisbett et al., Popular Induction: Information Is Not Necessarily 
Informative, in COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 113, 128-31 (John S. Carroll & John W. 
Payne eds., 1976). 
 165. See Bainbridge, supra note 120, at 1038; Langevoort, supra note 83, at 156-63. 
 166. See MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 17, at 90-91; Kevin Lane Keller & Richard 
Staelin, Effects of Quality and Quantity of Information on Decision Effectiveness, 14 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 200, 200-01 (1987) (including a review of the literature). 
 167. See Paredes, supra note 140, at 440-43. 
 168. See id. at 202; see also Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 119, at 156 (arguing 
that people with more information are more concerned with fairness, which will impact 
operation of the market). But see Lublin & Scannell, supra note 85 (quoting SEC Chair-
man Cox: “It’s an odd approach to suggest we’ll make better decisions with poorer infor-
mation . . . . I know of no market that works that way.”) 
 169. See Keller & Staelin, supra note 166, at 210-11. 
 170. See id.; see also MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 17, at 102-04 (describing study 
showing that increasing less-important information [how to use a product] resulted in in-
dividuals’ remembering less detail about some things [what precautions to take] and in-
stead remembering only more general information [what harm the product can cause]). 
 171. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 160, at 5; Colin Camerer et al., The Curse of 
Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1232, 1244-
46 (1989). 
 172. See Keller & Staelin, supra note 166, at 210-11. 
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eliminate information overload,173 it is an important consideration in 
the design of a disclosure system. The problem of information over-
load can also be addressed by the operation of intermediaries, who 
are trained to process and sift relevant information, provided that 
those intermediaries do not suffer from their own biases and cogni-
tive limitations.174 Information that is not standardized and informa-
tion that is not designed for easy comparisons will be less useful to a 
decision-maker.175 In addition, the ability to interpret information 
may depend on the sophistication of the decision-maker.176
 Once the targets of a disclosure system have processed the new in-
formation, they must decide whether and how to change their behav-
ior based on that information. The amount and nature of information 
that is likely to influence consumer behavior has been the subject of 
considerable study.177 For example, researchers have found that the 
amount of information a consumer will seek in purchasing big-ticket 
durables is significantly influenced by the nature of the earliest in-
formation the consumer receives.178 Consumers who initially used in-
formation from friends and family or the store where they purchased 
the product were less likely to seek other information than consum-
ers who used books and shopping guides.179 Perhaps surprisingly, 
consumers with advanced degrees sought less information than oth-
ers,180 and the price of an item purchased did not affect the amount of 
 173. See W. KIP VISCUSI & WESLEY A. MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER AND 
WORKER RESPONSES TO HAZARD INFORMATION 18-26 (1987).  
 174. See Paredes, supra note 140, at 452-59; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Intui-
tive Prediction: Biases and Corrective Procedures, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 157, at 414, 414-16. 
 175. See GRAHAM, supra note 7, at 13-18 (criticizing disclosure systems that fail to pro-
vide up-to-date, standardized, comparative, or otherwise easy-to-use information). 
 176. Where verifiable information is known to be available to one party in a transac-
tion but not disclosed to the other party, the second party should view that as a signal that 
the information is unfavorable to the first party. See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Rely-
ing on the Information of Interested Parties, 17 RAND J. ECON. 18, 30-31 (1986). Not all in-
dividuals will make this inference, however. In a study of the market for salad dressings 
prior to required nutrition labeling, the market share of the nondisclosing (and presumably 
higher-fat) brands varied with the percentage of college-educated shoppers in the popula-
tion. Alan D. Mathios, The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws on Product Choices: An 
Analysis of the Salad Dressing Market, 43 J.L. & ECON. 651, 665 (2000). 
 177. See, e.g., ROBERT LEVINE, THE POWER OF PERSUASION (2003). 
 178. See Richard Staelin & John W. Payne, Studies of the Information-Seeking Behav-
ior of Consumers, in COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 164, at 185, 199-200. 
 179. Id. at 195-96; see also Ginger Zhe Jin, Consumer Information About Health Plan 
Quality: Evidence Prior to the National Medicare Education Program 13-15 (Dec. 18, 2002) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.glue.umd.edu/~ginger/research/Medicare-
Dec02.pdf. Professor Jin notes that although consumers say they want information on 
health care providers, it is not clear that they use it. See id. at 3. Rather, they generally 
use “self experiences, experience of trusted friends and family members, and doctor rec-
ommendations” more frequently than formally available information. Id.
 180. See Staelin & Payne, supra note 178, at 201. 
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information sought prior to purchase.181 Other studies show that con-
sumers respond more readily to a specific warning about a single 
hazard than to a general warning.182 Furthermore, only new informa-
tion, not repeated exhortations about old information (such as warn-
ings about tobacco and seat belts), will affect behavior.183
 It is also harder to get people to change behavior than it is to in-
fluence a single decision that they are going to make anyway.184
Similarly, influencing consumers to make a one-time change in be-
havior, such as the purchase of a smoke detector, is easier than caus-
ing them to change patterns of behavior over time.185 Even if indi-
viduals’ attitudes change, they may not change their behavior.186
Some studies have concluded that information does not change be-
havior at all, that consumers are not interested in safety information, 
and that providing more information can be counterproductive by 
leading people to become more set in their ways.187   
 Another consideration involved in whether someone will change 
her behavior in response to information is whether the information is 
salient.188 “[C]oncrete, emotionally interesting information” is more 
likely to influence behavior than abstract information because such 
information is more likely to call up “ ‘scripts’ . . . or schemas involv-
ing similar information.”189 Announcing that a product causes cancer 
is much more likely to change consumer behavior than publishing 
the fact that it exceeds the federal recommended daily allowance of 
fat, although the latter probably poses a much larger health risk.190
 Finally, a disclosure scheme that involves the action of firms, as 
most do, will depend on the complex and poorly understood mecha-
 181. See id. at 200-01. 
 182. See W. Kip Viscusi et al., Informational Regulation of Consumer Health Risks: An 
Empirical Evaluation of Hazard Warnings, 17 RAND J. ECON. 351, 361-62 (1986). 
 183. See VISCUSI & MAGAT, supra note 173, at 124. This may explain the phenomenon 
noted by fitness guru Richard Simmons: “ ‘There’ll always be some weird thing about eat-
ing four grapes before you go to bed, or drinking a special tea, or buying this little bean 
from El Salvador . . . . If you watch your portions and you have a good attitude and you 
work out every day you’ll live longer, feel better and look terrific.” Awaiting the Next Hot 
Diet Fad, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2005, at D4. 
 184. See Adler & Pittle, supra note 8, at 163.  
 185. Id. at 191. 
 186. Id. at 168-69. 
 187. See id. at 166-68. Alternatively, people may overreact. See MAGAT & VISCUSI, su-
pra note 17, at 163. 
 188. See VISCUSI & MAGAT, supra note 173, at 17 (noting that people “ignore informa-
tion that they feel has little benefit”). 
 189. Nisbett et al., supra note 164, at 128. This phenomenon illustrates the operation 
of the availability bias. 
 190. See generally MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 17, at 174-75 (discussing inappropri-
ate public fears); Kevin Helliker, supra note 147. For examples of the public’s inaccurate 
assessment of risks, see Cass Sunstein, Commentary, Fear Factor: Truth Is, Sunbathing Is 
Probably More Dangerous than Terrorism, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2003, at B11; see also
MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 17, at 12, 64. 
1118 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1089 
                                                                                                                   
nism by which firms act.191 As economists often note, firms are par-
ticularly susceptible to agency problems as a result of the differing 
incentives of different actors.192 Various theories attempt to provide 
an account of the way in which a firm will react to external stimuli 
such as regulation or new information.193 The structure of the firm 
will in large part determine the behavior of managers,194 and that 
structure may lead an individual to engage in behavior that does not 
advance the goals of the firm as a whole, but only the goals of her 
unit.195 In addition, information may be lost between levels of the hi-
erarchy.196 Systems theory suggests that firms function at an equilib-
rium which they try to maintain in response to external forces.197 Ac-
cording to this theory, a firm will “act” independently of the motiva-
tions of its employees.198 The view of the firm as a culture posits that 
each firm has a set of behaviors and attitudes that are its own, inde-
pendent of the individuals in the firm.199 The individuals within the 
firm will behave in accordance with the culture, and their behavior 
will in turn determine the actions taken by the firm.200
 Regulatory mechanisms, including disclosure, must take into ac-
count the fact that the structure of a firm and the behavior of indi-
viduals within a firm ultimately determine the behavior of the firm 
itself. Individuals in the firm will be subject to all the biases and 
cognitive quirks described above, but the structure of the firm itself 
influences decision-making. Senior managers may have an incentive 
to enhance the profitability of the firm201 because they have invested 
considerable personal capital in the firm and because their compen-
sation may be tied to the firm’s financial performance. Therefore, 
theoretically they have an incentive to respond to economic stimuli 
such as consumer preferences. In a large and complex organization, 
however, detailed information about consumer preferences may not 
be available to senior managers. Employees with access to consumer 
information may not have the same incentives or employment goals 
as employees responsible for designing the firm’s products or deter-
 191. See Edward L. Rubin, Images of Organizations and Consequences of Regulation, 6 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 347, 348 (2005). 
 192. See, e.g., id. at 351 (discussing the agency problems “rampant” in firms); Michael 
J. Meurer, Law, Economics and the Theory of the Firm, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 727, 733-36 
(2004) (discussing agency costs and the theory of the firm generally). 
193. See generally Meurer, supra note 192 (describing various models of economic or-
ganization); Rubin, supra note 191 (same). 
 194. See Rubin, supra note 191, at 353. 
 195. See id. at 356. 
 196. Id.
 197. See id. at 358. 
 198. See id. at 360. 
 199. See id. at 362-63. 
 200. See id. at 364; see also Krawiec, supra note 19, at 599-601. 
 201. Alternatively, they may have an incentive only to enhance their own wealth. 
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mining its labor or hazardous waste disposal policies.202
 Disclosure policies that depend on firms’ responses to market ac-
tivity must consider whether the internal structure of firms makes it 
likely that such responses will occur. For example, information that 
affects the capital markets and the reputation of the firm may be 
more likely to result in changes in firm behavior than information 
that affects a product market because those effects are more likely to 
come to the attention of senior management.203
C.   Mechanisms of Operation 
 Given what we know about how people process information and 
how information can affect behavior, how can a disclosure system ac-
complish a regulatory goal? Most disclosure systems operate through 
markets, in the broadest sense of the word.204 Providing information 
to decision-makers is expected to cause them to choose the better 
product. If enough people make that choice, bad products will be 
forced out of the market altogether or producers will raise the quality 
of their own products. So, for example, restaurant hygiene improved 
in Los Angeles after enactment of an ordinance that required hygiene 
scores to be posted,205 and the output of toxic waste declined after the 
institution of the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), which required 
firms to disclose the amount of certain named pollutants they pro-
duced.206 There are other mechanisms also, however, such as reputa-
tional effects and simple persuasion by which disclosure can operate. 
A disclosure system’s purpose, as well as its context, will determine 
the mechanisms by which it can operate. 
 202. Cf. Joseph P. White & Stephen Power, VW Chief Confronts Corporate Culture,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2005, at B2 (quoting Volkswagen AG’s chief executive’s complaints 
that “managers and engineers . . . paid too much attention to technology and features” and 
not enough to customers and that “[m]anagers considered their operations successful be-
cause they booked profits on sales to other VW business units”). 
 203. See RONALD J. ALSOP, THE 18 IMMUTABLE LAWS OF CORPORATE REPUTATION:
CREATING, PROTECTING, AND REPAIRING YOUR MOST VALUABLE ASSET 36-51 (2004) (stating 
that a corporation’s reputation depends on how well it balances the demands of its various 
stakeholder groups). 
 204. See, e.g., Parkinson, supra note 14, at 11-19 (describing operation of product, la-
bor, and financial markets); cf. Sage, supra note 7, at 1781 (citing operation of “competitive 
forces, grassroots activism, and reputational concerns” in disclosure schemes). A few in-
formation schemes—such as the food pyramid, tobacco warning labels, and advertising to 
discourage drunk driving and encourage seatbelt use—operate solely by persuasion. Pro-
grams which are intended to persuade people to abandon risky behaviors can be distin-
guished from those that seek only to inform people of risks and allow them to make their 
own judgments—such as nutrition and pesticide labeling and warnings about drug side ef-
fects. See GRAHAM, supra note 7, at 7. 
 205. See Jin & Leslie, supra note 132, at 410-11, 449-50. 
 206. See infra note 244. 
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1.   The Role of a Market 
 To the extent that a disclosure system is intended only to enhance 
an existing market by correcting an informational asymmetry, it 
achieves its purpose if the necessary information reaches the appro-
priate audience in a usable form. What the buyers do with the infor-
mation is irrelevant. However, the disclosure will be useless unless 
the disclosed information is actually interesting and useful to the de-
cision-makers in the market. As noted above, for example, one can 
criticize securities disclosure rules for requiring the disclosure of in-
formation that would not be material to most investors. Also, as dis-
cussed in Part IV.C.3, below, the information must be provided in a 
format that enables it to be understood by the relevant decision-
maker or, alternatively, be provided to intermediaries who will digest 
the information. Although these are not simple requirements, the use 
of a disclosure requirement to correct an information asymmetry in 
an existing market involves a relatively straightforward mechanism. 
 More commonly, however, regulatory disclosure schemes are in-
tended to produce a particular result in a market.207 Food labeling 
requirements about trans fatty acids presumably are intended not 
merely to inform consumers but also to encourage them to purchase 
healthier foods. If those consumers do so, manufacturers will adjust 
their formulations and produce healthier foods, or at least healthier 
alternatives. If for some reason consumers used the new information 
to increase their fat intake,208 the system would have improved the 
function of the market but not achieved its public health goal. If con-
sumers ignore the information completely, the system will have 
achieved nothing. Thus, the success of the nutrition labeling re-
quirements depends upon the way in which the new information af-
fects the market, which in turn depends on whether and how the in-
formation is used by consumers.  
 This market effect depends upon the existence of a number of 
conditions. First, the consumers must care about the information 
enough for it to change their decisions. A consumer’s choice of a 
health care provider, for example, may not be sensitive to price.209
Second, they must have a decision to make. Information cannot alter 
consumers’ behavior if the purchasing decision is out of their hands 
(as may be the case in the choice of health care plans or providers)210
 207. As part of its effort to improve the treatment of animals, the European Union is 
proposing to approve a label on food indicating that it was produced using “humane” meth-
ods. This will, it is hoped, encourage consumers to purchase such foods. Mary Jacoby, EU
Arm Backs ‘Humane’ Farming Label, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2006, at A19. 
 208. The temporary popularity of the high-fat Atkins diet makes this hypothetical not 
as absurd as it may seem. 
 209. See Sage, supra note 7, at 1725. 
 210. See id. at 1720-21. 
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or if there are no sufficiently similar competing products (which may 
be the case with hospitals or airlines).211 Third, the producer must be 
able to adjust its behavior in response to market pressures.212 Exist-
ing technology might not make it possible, for example, for a manu-
facturer to avoid using a toxic substance.213 Finally, all the actors in 
the regulatory drama—consumers, producers, and intermediaries—
must be acting at least somewhat rationally.  
 Consider OSHA’s Hazard Communication Standard (HCS),214
which requires chemical producers and employers to provide infor-
mation about the risks of toxic substances to the users of the chemi-
cals, including workers who are exposed to the chemicals in down-
stream workplaces.215 The premise of HCS is that participants in the 
labor market cannot demand the appropriate risk premium for expo-
sure to toxic substances unless they have information about toxicity 
in general and specific workplace exposure.216 Once workers are fully 
informed, wages and benefits will fully address the toxicity risk, 
manufacturers and employers will take “efficient care,” and toxic ex-
posure will be reduced.217 If the labor market is not efficient for rea-
sons other than information asymmetries218 or if other factors besides 
safety dominate decisions by workers, HCS cannot achieve its goal of 
improving workplace safety. 
2.   Nonmarket Mechanisms 
 Where the market conditions described above do not exist, there 
 211. Cf. June Kronholz, A New Wealth of Details for Comparing Colleges, WALL ST. J.,
June 30, 2004, at D1 (noting difficulty of making comparisons between colleges and uni-
versities despite the vast amount of available information). 
 212. See Lucian Bebchuk, The SEC: Beyond Disclosure, FORBES, Jan. 19, 2006, 
available at http://www.forbes.com/columnists/2006/01/18/sec-executive-comp-
comment-cx_lb_0119bebchuk.html (arguing that executive compensation disclosure will 
not reduce excessive compensation if the market for executives is not functioning). 
 213. Economists tell us that market pressures will eventually lead to the necessary 
technological developments, but there may be a substantial delay before that can be 
accomplished.  
 214. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (2006). 
 215. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 106 (1995). 
 216. See Leslie I. Boden & Carol Adaire Jones, Occupational Disease Remedies: The 
Asbestos Experience, in PUBLIC REGULATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON INSTITUTIONS AND 
POLICIES 321, 325-26 (Elizabeth E. Bailey ed., 1987); see also Thomas A. Lambert, Avoid-
ing Regulatory Mismatch in the Workplace: An Informational Approach to Workplace 
Safety Regulation, 82 NEB. L. REV. 1006, 1015-32 (2004) (identifying the problem of work-
place safety as an informational asymmetry). 
 217. See Boden & Jones, supra note 216, at 327-28; Lambert, supra note 216, at 1021 
n.69, 1038 n.118. But see MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 17, at 5-8, 168 (discussing inappro-
priate reactions to information about risk). 
 218. For a discussion of some of the limitations on bargaining in labor markets, see 
Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 229-31, 240-
45 (2001). 
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are other mechanisms by which information may affect behavior. The 
most powerful of these is through its effect on reputation. As one 
commentator has written, “[h]ad commentator Armstrong Williams 
been forced to disclose that the Education Department was going to 
pay him $240,000 to promote the No Child Left Behind Act, he might 
not have taken the money.”219 Programs such as “Johns TV,” which 
post the names and faces of those arrested or convicted of solicitation 
of prostitution on local-access television or the Internet, have been 
remarkably successful.220 It has been proposed that colleges be re-
quired to disclose racial and economic data for “legacy” and early-
decision admissions, in the hope that schools will voluntarily limit 
such preferences once their effects are known.221 Reputational effects 
can be especially important to firms, which must rely on goodwill 
among customers, employees, and the government.222 Anyone using 
information to affect a firm’s reputation must take into account 
the fact that customers, investors, employees, juries, and regula-
tors will often make decisions about firms based on prior, back-
ground understandings rather than rational analysis.223 In order 
for information to have a reputational effect, however, the target 
must be concerned about its reputation and the public must care 
about the information disclosed.224
 Alternatively, a disclosure scheme can cause the desired result 
when concerned groups use the information in the political sphere.225
Information may be politically exploited in a number of ways, includ-
ing lobbying for direct legislation or regulation and conducting boy-
cotts and other collective action.226 An example of this type of disclo-
sure scheme was created by NEPA,227 which requires governmental 
 219. David Wessel, Conflict-of-Interest Disclosures May Not Protect the Unsophisticated,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2005, at A2; see also Sage, supra note 7, at 1769-70 (arguing that disclo-
sure of unprofessional behavior would discourage that behavior among professionals). 
 220. See Eva-Marie Ayala, Dallas Police Web Site Posts Photos of Arrested Johns, FORT 
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, June 8, 2004, at B5.  
 221. See Daniel Golden, Bill Would Make Colleges Report Legacies, Early Admissions,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2003, at B1.  
 222. See Ronald J. Alsop, Word of Mouth Is Cheap, but Valuable, Survey Finds, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 6, 2005 (discussing importance of reputation generally); Alsop, supra note 203, 
at 36-51 (same); Karkkainen supra note 11, at 327-28 (same); Graham, supra note 7, at 8 
(discussing importance of reputation to employees); Parkinson, supra note 14, at 14 (dis-
cussing importance of reputation in dealing with governments). 
 223. See supra notes 158-65 and accompanying text (discussing examples of cognitive bi-
ases).
 224. It is interesting to contemplate whether “Sewer Bill Scofflaw TV” would be likely 
to decrease delinquency rates. See Russ Pulley, Tattletale Television, KANSAS CITY STAR,
July 10, 2005, at B1 (describing suggestion that city post on local-access television the 
names of residents who were delinquent on their sewer bills). 
 225. See Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 310, 315; Sage, supra note 7, at 1784; Sunstein, 
supra note 8, at 619 (citing “eco-labels” as an example). 
 226. See Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 316-20 (discussing the regulation context). 
 227. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000). 
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agencies to produce an environmental impact study for any project 
having a major effect on the environment. The goal of the act is sim-
ply to compile and disclose the data; the agency does not have to con-
sider it or give it weight.228 However, members of the public receive 
the information and can take political action on the matter if they 
care.229 Similarly, proposed disclosure requirements under the secu-
rities laws relating to corporations’ social activities often have as 
their goal making information available to political activists, rather 
than investors.230 Community Reinvestment Act231 disclosure, which 
was effective in causing actual changes in lending practices, was 
used by the Federal Reserve and the Comptroller of the Currency in 
the merger approval process, by advocacy groups, and by the me-
dia.232 In order for disclosure to operate through a political mecha-
nism or collective action, of course, the disclosed information must be 
of interest to a sufficiently large and committed group. 
 A number of recent information-based regulations operate by cre-
ating a cascade of fears resulting from the disclosure of highly salient 
risk information to consumers. The interaction of consumers’ infor-
mation-processing mechanisms and the content and design of the 
disclosed information, together with the fact of disclosure itself, may 
result in the consumers overreacting to disclosed risks. This mecha-
nism was used by California’s Proposition 65, which requires that 
relevant products contain a warning stating that the product con-
tains a substance “known to the state [of California] to cause can-
cer.”233 The alleged purpose of the warning is to inform consumers 
about risks, but the warning provides no information about the ac-
tual risk,234 which may be poorly understood even by experts.235 How-
 228. Sunstein, supra note 8, at 621. 
 229. See id. at 622. 
 230. See Villiers, supra note 139, at 194-95, 202-03, 209-08; see also Donald C. Lange-
voort, Commentary: Stakeholder Values, Disclosure, and Materiality, 48 CATH. U. L. REV.
93, 95-96 (1998) (“If we are coming to see investors as simply one kind of corporate stake-
holder, why not provide disclosure for the benefit of other stakeholders (including public 
interests)?”).
231. 12 U.S.C.A. §§2901-2907 (2006) (establishing regulatory scrutiny of lending prac-
tices).  Disclosure is made pursuant to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C.A. 
§2801 et seq. (2006). 
 232. See Archon Fung et al., The Political Economy of Transparency: What Makes Dis-
closure Policies Sustainable? 20-22 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov., Harvard Univ., Faculty 
Research Working Paper No. RWP03-039, Oct. 2003), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=384922. 
 233. Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
25249.6 (West 1999); see also MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 17, at 165. Congress is cur-
rently considering a bill that would preempt state food-labeling laws that are inconsistent 
with FDA regulations. See National Uniformity for Food Act of 2005, H.R. 4167, 109th
Cong. (2005). 
 234. See MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 17, at 166; see also Kevin Helliker, supra note 
147 (reporting doctor’s position against warning about all dangers because some risks are 
very small and warnings may cause misunderstandings). 
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ever, the requirement reportedly resulted in manufacturers reformu-
lating their products to avoid the labeling requirement,236 thus, per-
haps, achieving the regulatory goal.237
 Similarly, the new requirement that food labels disclose the pres-
ence of common allergens in any amount, including trace amounts 
caused by cross-contamination,238 has resulted in several manufac-
turers reformulating their products.239 The FDA has not required, or 
even issued guidance about, disclosing the amount of the allergen 
present or its likelihood of producing a reaction, in part because peo-
ple react differently to allergens.240 The labeling requirement may 
therefore cause those with mild allergies to avoid foods that are per-
fectly safe because they do not have the information needed to assess 
their risk. More likely, manufacturers will reformulate their products 
to remove trace amounts of allergens that would have made the food 
hazardous to a relatively small number of people. 
3.   The Usefulness of Information 
 Whether the information is directed at a market, at reputations, 
or at community groups, it must be disclosed in a usable way.241 The 
format of information is extremely important in determining its use-
 235. See Peter Waldman, Toxic Traces: New Questions About Old Chemicals, WALL ST.
J., July 25, 2005, at A1 (describing new research casting doubt on much that is currently 
believed about chemical toxicity). 
 236. See Randolph B. Smith, California Spurs Reformulated Products, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 1, 1990, at B1, cited in Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 345 n.364. 
 237. Banning the products would have required a cost-benefit analysis of a product 
ban. See BREYER, supra note 10, at 163, 184-85, 193 (describing issues and analysis sur-
rounding proposed ban on saccharin and the disutility of using warnings instead); supra 
note 11 and accompanying text. The disclosure system accomplished the same result using 
essentially uninformed decision-making by consumers untrained in either toxicology or risk 
assessment. Cf. BREYER, supra note 10, at 162 (describing eight-year process of developing a 
tire rating system by the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration). 
 238. See Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-
282, Part II, codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 343 (2000). 
 239. See Jane Zhang, How Much Soy Lecithin Is in That Cookie?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 
2005, at D1; CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
APPROACHES TO ESTABLISH THRESHOLDS FOR MAJOR FOOD ALLERGENS AND GLUTEN IN 
FOOD 45-48 (Mar. 2006), available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~acrobat/alrgn2.pdf (de-
scribing factors to consider in setting thresholds); id. at 47-48 (describing problem of seri-
ous reactions to very low doses of allergens). 
 240. See Zhang, supra note 239, at D1. 
 241. See BREYER, supra note 10, at 163-64; cf. Schwarcz, supra note 90, at 8-9 (discuss-
ing SEC initiatives to make disclosure more understandable); Note, The Elephant in the 
Room: Evolution, Behavioralism, and Counteradvertising in the Coming War Against Obe-
sity, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1182 (2003) (discussing FDA’s failed efforts to ensure a useful 
format for nutrition labels); Laura Landro, The Informed Patient: Doctor’s Orders Are 
Useless if They’re Befuddling, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2003, at D2 (discussing ways to im-
prove patients’ understanding).   
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fulness.242  For comparisons, for example, the information must be in 
the same format for both items and placed where the decision-maker 
will see it at the time of decision.243 Information about single facts is 
more useful than a wide range of information,244 and in some circum-
stances rating systems are more useful than raw data.245 Even pres-
entation, typeface, and design can make a significant difference in 
the usefulness of information.246
 In addition, intermediaries can serve to increase the usefulness of 
information in other areas as they do in securities markets. For one 
thing, if there are a sufficient number of informed buyers, the market 
itself can act as an intermediary for the uninformed and unsophisti-
cated,247 just as the securities market does. Alternatively, intermedi-
aries, such as the media and special interest groups, can act to inter-
pret disclosed information or digest it into a small number of usable 
signals in the same way that financial information is theoretically 
built into the price of a security by the action of the market. Inter-
mediaries, especially the media, can also serve to increase the sali-
ence of disclosed information. There is a danger, of course, that the 
interpretation of information by intermediaries may be biased. 
Therefore, a disclosure system that relies on intermediaries should 
consider how those intermediaries themselves will operate, and the 
information disclosed should be designed for use by the intermediar-
ies.248 In some contexts, such as the “Energy Star” ratings on home 
appliances, intermediaries are not necessary. On the other hand, dis-
closure of more complex information into a market where there are 
no intermediaries is unlikely to produce the desired effect.  
 Format, design, and the presence of intermediaries are particu-
larly important considerations when the disclosed information is 
complex or where additional knowledge is required to understand the 
information. OSHA’s Hazard Communication Standard can be effec-
tive only to the extent workers are capable of understanding the 
 242. See MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 17, at 133-56, 159-60; Viscusi et al., supra note 
182, at 356-61 (discussing results of tests of varying warning labels on bleach and drain 
cleaners). Recent FDA drug labeling rules focus solely on format. See Anna Wilde 
Mathews, FDA Issues New Rules for Drug Labels, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2006, at D1. 
 243. For example, comparative information should be placed separately at the point of 
sale, not on the package. See VISCUSI & MAGAT, supra note 173, at 18-19, 26, 29, 33-38; see 
also Lambert, supra note 216, at 1042-44 (arguing that consumers need informational in-
termediaries when data is not presented in a comparative format). 
 244. See J. Edward Russo et al., Nutrition Information in the Supermarket, 13 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 48, 62, 64-65 (1986).  
 245. See id. at 59, 67; Jin, supra note 179, at 13, 15. 
 246. See Viscusi et al., supra note 182, at 356-61. 
 247. See Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Mandatory Versus Voluntary 
Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 45, 
50 (2003); Lambert, supra note 216, at 1024 n.77, 1038 n.117, 1061-62. 
 248. See, e.g., Mathews, supra note 242 (describing FDA drug-labeling rules aimed 
at physicians). 
1126 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1089 
                                                                                                                   
risks of the substances described and of pricing those risks.249 The 
fact that disclosure systems are often used where substantive regulation 
is difficult may increase the likelihood that they will require the disclo-
sure of information whose relevance is poorly understood.250
4.   Examples 
 The complicated mechanisms by which disclosure systems operate 
is illustrated by the TRI, which was successful in reducing toxic re-
leases.251 Because the information was so widely used by political 
groups, by the media, and by investors, it is difficult to say what 
caused firms to adjust their behavior. Among the possibilities are the 
fear of substantive regulation,252 the desire to preserve corporate 
goodwill with consumers and workers,253 the desire to preserve the 
personal reputation of managers, the sudden realization by manag-
ers that they were polluting,254 concern for the firm’s stock price in 
view of investor reaction either to the pollution itself or to the poten-
tial regulatory response to the fact of pollution,255 or, most likely, a 
combination of these factors.256
 Campaign finance disclosure, which requires reporting of the 
sources and amounts of contributions and expenditures,257 tends to 
operate through intermediaries such as interest groups, political par-
ties, and the media, who have an interest in compiling that informa-
tion and drawing it to the attention of voters.258 Moreover, the infor-
mation itself operates as a signal about additional, undisclosed in-
formation. The identity of a candidate’s or proposition’s supporters 
can help voters decide how to vote, especially if the supporters have 
 249. See supra note 218; see also Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 325 (noting that infor-
mation disclosed under the Hazard Communication Standard is not standardized or pre-
sented in useful form). 
 250. See GRAHAM, supra note 7, at 18-19 (arguing that nutrition and other risk infor-
mation is—and should be—of limited utility because no one really understands the tar-
geted risks); cf. Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 291 (noting, as a benefit of the TRI, that it 
does not require the EPA to determine the risk of a substance). 
 251. See Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 287-88. For an excellent discussion of the rele-
vant mechanisms by which the TRI operated, see id. at 294-331. 
 252. See id. at 311. 
 253. See id. at 323-28. 
 254. See id. at 261, 295-300 (arguing that the standardized and easily analyzed TRI 
data enabled managers to address toxic releases and provided benchmarks by which they 
could measure their progress). 
 255. See id. at 323-24. 
 256. See id. at 328-29. 
 257. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1)-(2) (Supp. 2002). 
 258. See Garrett & Smith, supra note 125, at 297-98 (noting the role of political parties 
and interest groups in simplifying voter choice). But see Elizabeth Garrett, The William J. 
Brennan Lecture in Constitutional Law: The Future of Campaign Finance Reform Laws in 
the Courts and in Congress, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 665, 690-91 (2002) (noting that in-
termediaries tend to provide incomplete and one-sided information). 
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well-known ideological or political positions.259 Similarly, if the goal 
of campaign finance disclosure is discouraging corruption, rather 
than or in addition to informing voters,260 then the information is 
likely to be used by opposing parties and the media to draw attention 
to patterns of donations and behavior. That attention in turn oper-
ates through a reputational effect. 
 The disclosure of labor practices can provide ammunition for vari-
ous groups in the political process. It is also expected to lead to con-
sumers’ and investors’ refusing to deal with companies with unac-
ceptable labor practices.261 This expectation is based on a number of 
perhaps unfounded assumptions: first, that consumers and investors 
care enough about labor practices to act on that interest when mak-
ing purchasing decisions;262 second, that consumers and investors 
understand the implications of the information they receive;263 and 
third, that firms will respond to the behavior of consumers and in-
vestors by improving labor practices.264 The design of the disclosure 
system can take these variables into consideration once the mecha-
nism of the system’s operation is understood.265
D.   Disadvantages to the Use of Disclosure as Regulation 
 Even if a regulator has an identifiable goal that is likely to be met 
by the disclosure of information, there are additional considerations 
it must take into account. Disclosure has costs, including costs to 
create, compile, and publish the relevant information,266 and the 
costs of any particular disclosure scheme may outweigh its bene-
fits.267 Disclosure schemes, like all regulation, can also have unin-
 259. See Garrett, supra note 258, at 678-80. 
 260. See Elizabeth Garrett, McConnell v. FEC and Disclosure, 3 ELECTION L.J. 237, 
238-42 (2004).  Professor Garrett describes the Justices’ evaluation of the purposes of cam-
paign finance disclosure and its method of operation, including the importance of interme-
diaries and the use of heuristics, id. at 239-40, as well as its possible negative effects, id. at 
241-43.  She also notes the Court’s emphasis on disclosure of the true identities of con-
tributors not only to deter corruption but also to ensure informed voting.  Id. at 240-41. 
 261. See Doorey, supra note 127, at 357, 378, 390, 393, 394. 
 262. It is one thing to care about labor practices and another to refuse to purchase an 
otherwise desirable product because of them. See Pat Auger & Timothy M. Devinney, Do 
What Consumers Say Matter? The Misalignment of Preferences with Unconstrained Ethical 
Intentions (Apr. 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=901861. 
 263. See Doorey, supra note 127, at 380-84 (noting that wages that seem outrageous to 
American consumers may in fact be quite high and attractive for workers in foreign locations). 
 264. See id. at 386-88 (describing unintended consequences such as firms simply stop-
ping production and thereby significantly worsening conditions for local workers). 
 265. See id. at 395-404 (evaluating several proposed disclosure schemes based on 
these criteria). 
 266. See Sage, supra note 7, at 1721-22. 
 267. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 626. 
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tended consequences.268 If disclosure of more information is tied to 
the disclosure of some, the scheme may discourage the disclosure of 
any information at all.269 The costs of complying with disclosure obli-
gations may result in some actors withdrawing from the market.270
In addition, required disclosure can lead disclosers to “game” the sta-
tistics.271 Report cards on bypass surgery reportedly caused some 
hospitals to reject sicker patients.272 Law professors may be familiar 
with the practice of some law schools to alter the statistics used in 
the vilified U.S. News and World Report survey.273
 Intended consequences also have costs. California may have in-
tended Proposition 65 to force producers to reformulate their prod-
ucts to exclude “cancer-causing” substances. That reformulation had 
costs. Because the regulation used disclosure, however, the cost-
benefit analysis, if any, was unlikely to focus on those costs. Instead, 
most regulators consider only the direct costs of producing the infor-
mation.274 In fact, no one considered whether the costs of reformulat-
ing a product outweighed the risk from the substances involved: the 
consumer did not have the necessary information, and, because con-
sumers generally avoided products bearing the warning label, the 
producers had to weigh the costs of reformulation against the benefit 
of continuing to sell their products at all. 
 In sum, although there are a variety of ways in which disclosure 
systems can accomplish their goals, their effectiveness will be limited 
by a number of factors that must be taken into account in the design 
of the system. Moreover, only when one understands the mechanism 
by which the disclosure system will operate can one assess the likeli-
hood that it will in fact achieve its goal and what the true costs of the 
disclosure requirement are.275 Because disclosure systems are politi-
 268. See David Wessel, Grading Surgeons May Be Healthy Practice, WALL ST. J., July 
6, 2006, at A2 (noting that poorly rated surgeons may have moved to states that did not 
have report cards); Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Transparency in the Budget 
Process 11 (Univ. of S. Cal. L. Sch., Legal Studies Working Paper Series No. 6, Jan. 23, 
2006) (noting that transparency early in the budget process can allow special interest 
groups to intervene in the legislative process). 
 269. Sunstein, supra note 8, at 628. 
 270. See Sage, supra note 7, at 1721-22. 
 271. See Hu, supra note 35, at 1317. 
 272. David Wessel, Eatery Report Cards: A Model for Schools?, WALL ST. J., May 29, 
2003, at A2. 
 273. See Jeffrey E. Stake, The Interplay Between Law School Rankings, Reputations, 
and Resource Allocation: Ways Rankings Mislead, 81 IND. L.J. 229, 232-42 (2006); Alex 
Wellen, The $8.78 Million Maneuver, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2005, § 4A, at 18. 
 274. See Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 6542 
(proposed Feb. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 228-40, 245, 249, 274), available at
http://www.iasplus.com/usa/0601seccompensation.pdf (discussing variety of costs of 
collection, preparation, and publication of information but not considering the costs of 
any consequences). 
 275. Cf. MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 17, at 1-2 (noting the need for cost-benefit 
analysis in adopting disclosure systems). 
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cally palatable and relatively cheap, however, they are often adopted 
without that understanding and assessment. 
V.   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 Commentators have suggested a number of factors determining 
whether a disclosure system is likely to succeed.276 For example, a 
disclosure scheme is more likely to adapt and survive over time if 
disclosers have a stake in its success; if the disclosers receive some 
benefit from disclosure; and if the disclosure is aimed at organized, 
committed user groups.277 Disclosure systems are less likely to work 
where disclosers are required to report negative information about 
themselves and where the information must be newly created.278 Dis-
closure obligations must also be enforced.279 The enforcement 
scheme, like the disclosure system itself, must be designed in accor-
dance with the goals of the system and its method of operation. 
 A more complete analysis of a variety of disclosure schemes sug-
gests additional criteria for success and considerations for adoption. 
First, a regulator must identify a specific regulatory goal, preferably 
a non-pretextual one, for the disclosure system.280 Increasing the 
amount of information available to the public is not an acceptable 
regulatory goal in itself.281 Rather, if the goal of a disclosure system 
is to provide more information to consumers, investors, or the public, 
the regulatory purpose must address why that information will be 
useful to an underlying regulatory goal and why it is not currently 
available. The fact that a disclosure scheme may appear less intru-
sive than traditional regulation should not excuse regulators from 
stating their goal, not least because the goal of a disclosure system 
will determine the mechanism by which it is likely to operate.282
 Second, the regulator must identify one or more mechanisms 
through which the disclosure system will operate and should show 
that the operation of that mechanism is likely to achieve the regula-
 276. See GRAHAM, supra note 7, at 29-30.
 277. See Fung et al., supra note 232, at 38-40. 
 278. See id. at 34 (noting the potential budget impact and the negative effects on 
reputation). 
 279. See, e.g., Sage, supra note 7, at 1821-23. 
 280. See BREYER, supra note 10, at 34-35. Traditionally, regulation was justified by the 
inability of the market to deal with “structural” problems. Id. at 15. The first step of such 
regulation is to identify the problem with the market. See id. at 15-34 (describing possible 
problems requiring regulatory intervention). 
 281. One can imagine a Monty-Pythonesque department of information, charged by 
Congress with ensuring that all sorts of useful and useless information are disseminated. 
At present, however, there is no such agency (other than, some might argue, the SEC). 
 282. Cf. Lambert, supra note 216, at 1013-14, 1032-33 (arguing that the process of 
adopting workplace safety regulations should be first, to identify the problem; second, to 
identify the market failure responsible for the problem; and third, to identify the appropri-
ate way to fix that market failure). 
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tory goal.283 If the regulator cannot identify such a mechanism, dis-
closure is not an appropriate method of regulation.284 In addition, the 
disclosure system must be designed with the operative mechanism in 
mind. If the system is intended to operate through its effect on a de-
cision-maker’s reputation, the information must be designed to reach 
an audience the decision-maker cares about and it must contain 
information the audience is likely to find interesting. If disclosure 
is expected to operate through the political process, it must be di-
rected at an issue likely to attract the attention of an organized 
interest group. 
 If the disclosure system is intended to operate through a market 
of some kind, that market must be further examined. The regulator 
must show that additional information will be sufficiently salient and 
in sufficiently usable form to reach and have an effect on the behav-
ior of market participants, either directly or through the operation of 
intermediaries. Whether market participants are likely to respond 
rationally to the proposed information and whether they have the 
power to change others’ behavior by their own market behavior must 
also be considered. The content and format of the disclosed informa-
tion should be designed to account for the target audience’s likely 
heuristic biases and decision-making processes. The biases of any in-
termediaries must also be taken into consideration. The regulator 
must also conclude that the market is sufficiently competitive that 
decision-makers have meaningful choices and producers have an in-
centive to react to changes in demand. To the extent the behavior of 
firms is part of the picture, the regulator must consider whether 
firms are likely to respond to the market signal as hoped.  
 If the disclosure system is not expected to operate through any of 
these mechanisms, the regulator must identify an alternative. Per-
haps the disclosure requirement is intended to force firms to gather 
information they would otherwise ignore and thereby improve man-
agers’ performance. Perhaps the disclosure is intended to allow coop-
eration among firms by making information about innovations avail-
able both for further development and for challenge and testing. 
Such disclosure schemes must be carefully designed to provide in-
formation in a form useful for those purposes. 
 Once the regulator has identified the mechanism by which a dis-
closure system is expected to operate, she must consider the costs of 
the scheme. These will include not only the costs of creating, gather-
ing, and disseminating the information but also the costs resulting 
 283. See BREYER, supra note 10, at 191-94 (describing appropriate steps to creating 
disclosure requirements); see also Lambert, supra note 216, at 1067-69 (proposing struc-
ture for adoption of workplace safety disclosure requirements). 
 284. See BREYER, supra note 10, at 193. 
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from disclosers or targets changing their behavior in response to the 
scheme.285 The costs of unintended consequences, which are likely to 
be identified during a notice-and-comment process, must also be con-
sidered. As with all regulation, all those costs must be weighed 
against the anticipated benefits before the scheme is adopted. In 
short, adoption of a disclosure system should not be easy. 
 In sum, every disclosure scheme must have an articulated pur-
pose, an identified mechanism through which it can accomplish that 
purpose, a design that takes into account the operation of that 
mechanism, and a careful analysis showing that the benefits of the 
system outweigh its costs. Traditionally, securities disclosures have 
met these criteria, although some specific disclosure requirements 
may be of questionable utility. Moreover, securities disclosure oper-
ates in a very unusual context. Securities regulation can serve as a 
model for other disclosure systems only if they are similarly crafted, 
carefully considered, and designed to operate by identifiable and 
plausible mechanisms. 
 285. See Rubin, supra note 191, at 390 (noting that firms can usually find a way to 
avoid regulation if they want to badly enough). 
